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This thesis is a case study of the debate over the decision
of the United States Government to procure the McDonnell
Douglas AV-8B Advanced Harrier V/STOL jet aircraft for the
0. S. Marine Corps. It includes a history of the develop-
ment of the AV-8A Harrier, the development of the Marine
Corps 1 concept of employment of V/STOL aircraft, and the de-
velopment of the AV-8B. The study centers around the ac-
tions taken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of the Navy, the O.S. Navy, the O.S. Marine
Corps, and the Congress of the United States in the contro-
versy over the AV-8B during the period 1977-1980. That con-
troversy was over the decision to equip the Marine light
attack force during the 198 0*s with either the AV-8B
Advanced Harrier or the A-18 Hornet to replace worn-out A-<*M
Skyhawks and A7-8A Harriers. The thesis follows both sides
of the argument over the A7-8B in the context of the PPBS
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a case study of the organizations and
people involved in the decision to aguire the the AV-8B
Advanced Harrier jet aircraft for the United States Marine
Corps. The aquisition of this particular aircraft was unusu-
al because of the large controversy it created. This thesis
will answer the question: What organizations were involved,
who were the actors involved, and what were their actions
throughout the controversy over the decision to aquire the
AV-8B?
The method of research for this thesis was to search for
and read the available literature on the development, pro-
curement, and employment of the Harrier aircraft, and the
controversy over its development and procurement. The
sources of data for this thesis were: military and aeronau-
tical journals (both foreign and American)
,
periodical lit-
erature, technical reports. General Accounting Office
Reports, and Congressional Hearings and Reports. All of the
sources used for this thesis were unclassified.
The thesis includes the history of the Harrier aircraft,
and how it came in to use in the U.S. Marine Corps (see
Appendix A for a concise chronology). The concept of opera-
tional employment of the original Harriers by the Marine
Corps is covered, as well as the results of Marine opera-
tional experience with that first generation Vertical and
Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft. The thesis
centers around the development of an American-made second
generation Harrier and the controversy over that Advanced
Harrier, as well as the other aircraft that was competing
for a place in the Marine Air Wings, the F/A-18 Hornet.

This thesis studies the story of the aquisition of the
A7-8B in the context of the bureaucratic procedures for
aquiring a major weapon system. Funding for Marine aircraft
is included in the Navy budget because all Marine Corps air-
planes are purchased with money that is appropriated by
Congress in the Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN) appropria-
tion. The Aircraft Procurement Navy appropriation is just
one part of the defense budget that must work its way
through the Department of Defense Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System (PPBS) into the Presidents proposed budget
that goes to Congress each January. In addition to being in-
cluded in the military long range financial plan (the PYDP
or Five Year Defense Plan) and in the annual budget (in the
APN appropriation), a new aircraft program must pass all the
hurdles cf the Major System Acquisition process. This pro-
cess requires that any critical weapon system, one that re-
quires special management and expenditure of a relatively
large amcunt of resources, have its justification, objec-
tives, basic concept, development, production, and acquisi-
tion periodically reviewed by military and civilian
officials of the individual service involved (the Department
of the Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council and the
Secretary of the Navy in the case of Marine Corps aviation
assets) as well as by military and civilian officials in the
Department of Defense (the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council, or DSARC, and the Secretary of Defense).
This thesis will lock at the people and organizations that
were involved in these parallel processes for the
procurement of the AV-8B Advanced Harrier.

II. THE V/STOL CONCEPT AND 12 E AV-8A HARRIER
A. WHY V/STOL?
In the late 1950' s and early 1960's there were many
American Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) air-
craft designs that had been brought to the point of actually
having an aircraft flying, but none of these were developed
further into a fully operational aircraft [Ref. 1: p. 41].
The availability of new technology often provided a push for
some new military weapon to be developed using that technol-
ogy, but tight defense budgets constrained the development
of many potential weapon systems, With the combination of
sever ly constrained military spending and many new technolo-
gies being offered as possible weapons, a new idea had to
show that it could satisfy a firm and proven military re-
quirement before any money would be appropriated for devel-
opment. This fact had a nullifying effect on the new concept
of jet V/STOL during the 50 »s and 50* s. By the early 1970«s
there was only one operational V/STOL aircraft in the world,
and it was of British design and manufacture. That British
program benefitted from some financial support from the
United States [Ref. 2: p. 3 36], but there was no U.S. pro-
gram in progress that was going to provide an American jet
V/STOL in the forseeable future.
By the end of the 1960*3, the defense staffs of nations
around the world were becoming more convinced that V/STOL
tactical aircraft technology was important. Earlier events
in the Middle East had shown that certain factors in the use
of tactical air power were becoming more important, factors
such as: independence from paved airfields, dispersal of
aircraft on the ground, and greater flexibility in

operations. In Europe, defense planners began to realize
that being forced to operate from a fixed number of easily
targeted airfields was going to be a handicap in any future
war fought there [Ref. 3: pp. 71-72]. From this realization
came the requirement to develop a jet V/STOL aircraft that
could provide immediate low level, high speed support in the
attack, or armed reconnaissance, and perform both of these
missions while operating from any suitable small clearing
close to the forward edge of the battle area. The Hawker
Siddeley Aircraft Company of Great Britain designed their
V/STOL jet to fill that requirement.
B. THE HAWKER SIDDELEY HARRIER
The cancellation of its design for a new fighter for the
Royal Air Force in 19 58 made excess production capacity
available at Hawker Siddeley [Ref. 2: p. 336]. To make use
of that excess capacity, work was begun on a jet V/STOL air-
plane. A suitable engine, called the BE53, was already un-
der development by the Bristol Aero Engine Company (who
later merged with the Rolls Royce Engine Company) . 75* of
the funds for the BE53 were provided by the United States
through the Mutual Weapons Defense Program (MWDP) [Ref. 4:
p. 273]. HWDP was an American program established in Europe
for the purpose of giving financial support in developing
weapons of interest to NATO. Hawker Siddeley's development
aircraft, called the P. 1127, first flew on 21 October 1960
[Ref. 5: p. 24]. That initial flight was a hover done while
the aircraft, for safety, was still tethered to the ground.
The P. 1127 made its first free hovering flight the following
month. The first flight during which the P. 1127 transitioned
from a hovering takeoff to conventional forward flight was
made in September 196 1 [Ref. 2: p. 336].
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An agreement between the United States, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany enabled Hawker Siddeley to build
nine follow-on aircraft to the P. 1127. These aircraft were
called Kestrels, The nine Kestrels were used by a tripar-
tite squadron during 1965 and 1966 to evaluate the opera-
tional potential of jet V/STOL [Ref. 5: p. 2H ]. The three
major services of the United States, the U.S. Air Force, the
U.S. Army, and the U.S. Navy, all sent pilots to participate
in the evaluation. The conclusion of the squadron's evalua-
tion was that the Kestrel did have significant operational
potential. After the Kestrel evaluation, the U.S. and
Germany lost interest in the aircraft, and Britain continued
the program alone.
In 1967, the Hawker Siddeley facility at Kingston-upon-
Thames received their first order for the world* s first op-
erational jet V/STOL aircraft, which was now named the
Harrier [Ref. 6: p. 569]. The Royal Air Force ordered 77 of
the single seat MkVs and 1 3 of the two-seated Mk2 trainers.
By April of 1969 the first Harrier squadron was in service
with the RAF.
C. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HARRIER
The Harrier is a single-engine, transonic, turbofan air-
craft. Fan and turbine air is exhausted through four rota-
table nozzles instead of going out through a tailpipe as in
Convention Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft. This type
of V/STOL design is called the vectored, or deflected,
thrust design [Ref. 7: p. 3 4]. The Harrier type of V/STOL
design is also known as the lift/cruise design. For verti-
cal flight the engine thrust is deflected, or vectored, ver-
tically downward and for forward flight the engine thrust is
vectored to the rear. For braking in flight the nozzles, or
ducts, can be vectored 18 degrees forward of the vertical,
11

and for other maneuvers the nozzles can be set to any posi-
tion in between. Control of the aircraft's attitude while
hovering is accomplished through a reaction control system
which operates on engine bleed air through the wing-tips,
the nose, and the tail. The Harrier has the combat thrust-
to-weight ratio of a conventional fighter using full after-
burner, but it uses much less fuel because it has no
afterburner. See Appendix B for more detailed
specifications of the Harrier.
The only other vertical design in operation today is the
Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) lift-plus-lift/cruise
design found in the Soviet YAK-36 Forger [ Ref . 8 : p. 27 ]. A
West German aircraft, the 7AK-191, also employs this design,
but it is only in the prototype stage. In this design there
is a large engine with one swivelling exhaust in the rear of
the aircraft combined with cne or more smaller lift-only
engines forward [Ref. 1: p. 35].
D. THE U.S. MARINE CORPS TAKES ON THE HARRIER
The philosophy of close air support in the Marine Corps
has not changed since the 1920's when it was first used.
Close air support is air attacks against hostile targets
close to friendly forces which require detailed integration
of each air mission with the fire and maneuver of these
forces [Ref. 9: p. 68]. Exactly how this close air support
of maneuvering ground combat units is accomplished has
changed throughout the years as weapons and types of air-
craft have changed, but the basic philosophy has not. Close
air support in the Marine Corps is consumer oriented
[Ref. 10: p. 115]. This means that in the Marine Corps the
ground commander is not told what type of air support he is
going to get and when he is going to get it, but he orders
the air support he needs to complement his scheme of
12

maneuver as he formulates his plan of attack. The whole
purpose of having a unique Marine air force is to support
the ground commander with aviation assets that have been
integrated into, and are a permanent part of, the Marine
air -ground team.
Hand-in-hand with the Marine 1 s philosophy of close air
support is their commitment to the V/STOL concept:
This commitment was formally stated in 1957 when
the Commandant of the Marine Corps. General
Randolph McC. Pate, stated in a letter to the
Chief of Naval Operations, "Vertical take-off and
landing characteristics are an ultimate require-
ment for all Marine aircraft in support of amphib-
ious operations in the future... Obtaining a
ST0L/V5T0L capability is vital to Marine
Aviation." In 1963, when technology advancements
made it appear possible that V/STO£ aircraft could
be competitive with conventional aircraft, the
Marine Mid-Range Objective Plan stated: "V/STOL
capability will be included in the requirement for
any aircraft it it provides a worthwhile improve-
ment in operational effectiveness without uhaccep-
tahly degrading flight performance or unduly
increasing overall support and maintenance." The
advantages of V/STOL were agian recognized in a
1965 study of long-range options. The recommenda-
tions of this study led to the formal requirement
for the AV-8A Harrier aircraft in 1965. [Ref. 11:
p. 58]
For the Marine Corps, the key to close air support is re-
sponsiveness. After a series of studies dating back to the
1950* s, the Marine Corps developed a concept involving the
use of aircraft capable of vertical flight that could stay
on the ground close to the battlefront. In 1968, an opera-
tional production V/STOL aircraft, the Harrier, became
available and the Marine Corps was watching its development
very closely [Ref. 12: p. 25]. The Marine Corps had not
participated in the tripartite evaluation of the Kestrel,
but they were very interested in the new Harrier with its
ability to operate from small clearings close the forward
edge of the battle area, its ability to operate from heli-
copter-sized platforms on ships, and its ability to operate
in both of these environments without any modifications to
the aircraft. These capabilities seemed very complementary
13

to the Marine^ requirement for responsiveness in close air
support and to the Marine* s unique mission of amphibious
warfare. In early 1969 the Marine Corps sent two officers.
Colonel Tom Miller and Lieutenant Colonel Bud Baker to
Enqland to fly the Harrier [Ref. 5: p. 24 ]. Speaking of
some of the Harriets unique capabilities that he had inves-
tigated during his flight s valuation in England, Col. Miller
said, ".. .these advantages provide an unprecedented potential
which could lead to a complete overhaul in aircraft tactics
and procedures." [Ref. 5: p. 27 ] The Marine Corps was con-
vinced that the Harrier was an aircraft suitable for their
use. In March of 1969 the Marine Corps ordered 12 Mk50
Harriers [Ref. 6: p. 569]. The Mk50 was Hawker Siddeley^
export version of the Harrier that used a slightly more pow-
erful engine, called the the Pegasus 11, to meet Marine
Corps specifications.
In April 1971 Marine Fighter- Attack Squadron 513
(VMFA-513) , then equipped with McDonnell Douglas F-4
Phantoms, was redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 513
(VMA-513) and received the first six U.S. Marine Harriers,
which had been given the American designation: AV-8A
[Ref. 13: p. 1].
E. THE MARINE CORPS EMPLOYMENT OF V/STOL
Between 1969 and 1971 the Marine Corps prepared for
their coming experiment with the Harrier. There was consid-
erable cooperation on the part of the British in this en-
deavor, particularly by the Royal Air Force [Ref. 13: p. 2].
The Marines got a good head start on their own training pro-
gram by having four instructor pilots train with the RAF.
The willingness of the RAF to sacrifice valuable Harrier
flight time in order to train those Marine pilots in RAF
test and operational billets gave a tremendous boost to the
14

Marine program. Along with the pilots, a significant number
of Marine maintenance personnel were trained by Hawker
Siddeley and the RAP in England.
In addition to the preparation of personnel to man the
first Marine Harrier squadron, the Marine Corps needed to
develop a doctrine of exactly how Marine squadrons were go-
ing to operate with this new type of aircraft. During 1970
the Marine Corps Development Center in Quantico, Virginia
refined the old concept of stationing a V/STOL capable air-
craft on the ground close to the supported units into a de-
tailed basic doctrine that could be tested by the first
squadron. The Marines planned to use the Harrier as a spe-
cialized aircraft with the primary mission of responding to
on-call requests for close air support [Ref. 14: p. 1 ]. The
manner in which the Harrier would be used for an on-call
mission is very different from the way a CTOL aircraft would
be used.
When a ground commander plans for close air support to
be used in his plan of attack, that support is called pre-
planned. Preplanned close air support is either scheduled
or on-call. Scheduled close air support is that which will
be delivered on specified targets at a specified time.
On-call close air support is that in which the commander
knows which target he wants attacked, but he does not know
exactly when the support will be required, so he requests
that mission be available any time he calls for it. With
conventional aircraft there are three techniques for provid-
ing on-call close air support:
1. Aircraft can be diverted from a lower priority mis-
sion. Aircraft that are already airborne in the vi-
cinity of the on-call mission can be used for the




2. Aircraft can be put on strip alert. In this technique,
aircraft are specifically assigned to the on-call mis-
sion. These strip alert aircraft are fueled and pre-
armed with appropriate weapons and the pilots are
standing by, waiting to "scramble" to their planes
when a request for close air support is received.
3. Aircraft can be flown in an orbiting pattern, in a lo-
cation safe from anti-aircraft fire, near the area
from which calls are to be expected. In this tech-
nique, the required number of aircraft are armed with
the proper ordnance and kept airborne, circling near
the unit they are assigned to support. Just before the
fuel in these aircraft is down to the amount of fuel
needed to do the the mission and still be able to re-
turn to the airfield, freshly fueled aircraft arrive
to take their place.
There are several disadvantages to handling on-call re-
quests with these techniques. Aircraft that are diverted
from another mission will most likely be loaded with a type
of ordnance that is not the best for the on-call mission.
If the airfield where the strip alert aircraft are located
is not close to the area where the support is required, then
much precious time is used up in getting to the target area.
Orbiting aircraft are very responsive, but that technique is
very expensive in fuel and in the amount of assets needed to
keep the right number of aircraft airborne and in orbit
continuously.
The Barine Corps develaped their concept of employment
of the Harrier to take advantage of two important attributes
of V/STOL aircraft: the ability to displace rapidly and the
ability to operate from dispersed sites. By relying on these
two important Harrier features, the concept developed by the
Marines combines the best qualities of the strip alert and
16

the orbiting techniques - responsiveness and efficiency.
This is accomplished by substituting "ground" loiter near
the supported troops for "air" loiter by orbiting aircraft
[Ref. 15: p. 24]. By dispersing the Harriers and position-
ing them close to the maneuver elements they are to support,
a much higher sortie rate* can be achieved. This means in-
creased responsiveness to the ground commanders calls. Of
course, the Marines had to develop this concept so that it
fit in with their amphibious mission. In addition, they had
some other requirements for the new concept to meet. First,
the concept had to work without any major changes in the ex-
isting Marine Tactical Air Control System. Second, the con-
cept had to be supportable without a large additional
logistics burden.
The fundamental idea behind the concept is the Harrier's
flexibility. The concept works by using the Harrier's abili-
ty to operate from many different types of bases. The types
of bases used in the concept are [Ref. 14: p. 2]:
1 - Sea Base. This would be the means of getting the
Harriers to the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) , and
could be any of several kinds of ships, such as a
large aircraft carrier (CV) or one of the smaller am-
phibious helicopter carriers (LPH or LHA) . On these
large ships, the squadron would be deployed with full
logistic support (primarily fuel and ordnance) and
full maintenance support available. A study was con-
ducted at the Naval War College Center for Advanced
Research which concluded that it was feasible to use
several types of merchant ships as platforms for
V/STOL aircraft operations [Ref. 16: p. 68]. The
* A sortie is one operational flight by one aircraft
[Ref. 9: p. 316]. A sortie rate is the number of sorties




study emphasized that this idea was feasible without
depending on any dramatic technological breakthrough
and would utilize hardware {commercial freight con-
tainers and Marine Corps expeditionary shelters) al-
ready in existence.
2. Sea Platform. This would be any ship that had a heli-
copter-sized platform that the Harrier could temporar-
ily land on, then takeoff from when called, such as an
LPD or an LST. There would be no ordnance support, no
maintenance support, and very limited fuel support.
3- Forward Site. This would be aa austere site ashore
where the Harrier would land temporarily, like the sea
platform, to wait for a mission call. A forward site
could be a clearing in the woods, a road, or a small
stretch of hard-packed beach. There would be no logis-
tic or maintenance support available at one of these
sites.
*• Facilit y. This would be an ashore airfield of very
small size to accomodate Harriers and helicopters,
with perhaps a 1000 foot strip of aluminum matting for
a short runway. If the Harrier can get a short run
for takeoff instead of a strictly vertical takeoff, it
can carry a much larger pay load. At a facility, some
limited maintenance and some common types of ordnance
would be available.
5- Hain Base. The main base would be like the sea base,
only ashore. At this base the full range of logistic
and maintenance support would be available.
While the amphibious task force transits to the amphibi-
ous objective area, the Harrier squadron would be deployed
on a sea base. As the task force approached the AOA the
Harriers would arm and disperse to sea platforms throughout
the task force. The purpose of this dispersal would be
18

protection from air attack and also to enable the Harriers
to be more responsive when used over a wider area. After
flying a mission, the Harrier would return to the sea base
to be refueled and rearmed, then again disperse to some sea
platform to await a call to action. When more responsiveness
was needed, and the friendly forces had secured enough
terrain, the Harriers could begin to operate ashore. The
operations ashore would increase in three phases [Ref. 15:
pp. 21-22].
Phase I. Small detachments would operate from forward
sites after refueling and rearming at the sea base. If
there was not a suitable natural area for the forward site,
then a 75-foot square mat could be put down, or a plastic
mat could be sprayed onto a clear area in a few minutes.
After flying a mission from the forward site, the aircraft
would return to the sea base for fuel, bombs, and any needed
maintenance before returning to a forward site to land and
wait for a call. In this phase, aircraft would be operating
ashore close to the supported units much earlier than any
conventional aircraft could.
Phase II. Operations would begin from facilities. These
would be expanded sites with a strip (laid down or possibly
using a section of road) and with fuel, ordnance, and limit-
ed maintenance capability. Use of forward sites during
Phase I would certainly increase responsiveness, but in the
establishment of a facility there is a new capability for
the amphibious task force that is derived from V/STOL char-
acteristics. Responsive, survivable fixed-wing close air
support would be available while the buildup of large com-
plex bases is avoided. This is a significant increase in




Phase III. If the amphibious operation is of long dura-
tion, then a carrier task force will not be able to support
Harrier sea bases on a continuing basis, because it may be
needed for other missions away from the amphibious objective
area. During this phase main bases are established ashore.
During continuing operations, Harriers would operate from
the most complete and efficient base available, but more fa-
cilites and forward sites would be established as needed for
responsiveness when the situation dictated, to insure the
ground commander the necessary close air support he
requires.
F. THE MARINE CORPS 1 HARRIER EXPERIMENT
By 1972 the Marine Corps had 12 Harriers in operation
with VMA-513. Additionally, there were 48 more Harriers on
order from Hawker Siddeley, to be paid with FY71 and FY72
funds [Ref. 17: p. 52]. However, there were some members of
Congress who felt that the V/STOL technique was premature
and too expensive [Ref. 18: pp. 39-40]. Specifically, there
were three members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
closely associated with the Air Force* who wanted the A-X
aircraft (which later became the A- 10) for the Marine Corps,
at the expense of the AV-8A. The Marine Corps thought that
the Harrier didn't belong in the A-X controversy over what
aircraft was best to support the Army and that the Harrier
was best for use in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps
needed to get their V/STOL concept working and show that the
AV-8A was really what they needed.
* Senators Goldwater and Cannon, who were Major Generals
in the Air Force Reserve, and Senator Symington, who was a
former Secretary of the Air Force.
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In 1972 the Marine Corps conducted an operation to vali-
date their concept of employment for the Harrier- This oper-
ation was called VERSATILE WARRIOR [Ref. 17: pp. 52-53].
Exercise VERSATILE WARRIOR was conducted at Camp Lejuene,
North Carolina by a six plane detachment from VMA-513 and
was analyzed and reported on by the Weapons System
Evaluation Group. The WSEG, as it was known, was an organi-
zation within the Department of Defense under the cognizance
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineeering (OSDRSE) . The WSEG was an objective group of
evaluators from outside the Department of the Navy, headed
by an Air Force Major General, whose purpose was to evaluate
Navy systems [Ref. 19]. The WSEG was specifically assigned
as the test directorate for the Harrier. For this exercise,
the Marine Corps anticipated a regular sortie rate of four
per aircraft per day and a surge rate (an all out effort to
get the maximum rate for a short period of time) of six per
aircraft per day. The actual rates achieved were 6.4
regular, and 10.2 for a 16 hour surge period, which greatly
exceeded the anticipated rates. The Harrier's performance in
the VERSATILE WARRIOR exercise earned a very glowing report
from the objective Weapons System Evaluation Group and
completely won over some officials who previously held
strong reservations about the V/STOL aircraft. That the
AV-8A came through its trials exceedingly well should not
have been a surprise. The Harrier had been through ten
years of development and had 12,000 hours in operation with
two Royal Air Force squadrons based in Germany. It was truly
an "off the shelf" aircraft, something that the U.S.
military was not used to having [Ref. 20: p. 1036].
By 1973 the Marine Corps felt that its experience with
the Harrier and the results of exercises like VERSATILE
WARRIOR had certainly validated the operational concept they
21

had concieved. The Marine Corps now had plans to convert
their air arm into an all V/STOL force- This conversion
would be accomplished in three phases [ Ref . 21: pp. 48-51].
Phase I. Procure the AV-8A and demonstrate that the
V/STOL concept is valid. The Marines operated the Harriers
in almost every conceivable environment, and though they had
some problems the operations were considered very success-
ful. The AV-8A was a first generation aircraft, and admit-
tedly had some shortcomings, such as limited range and
pay load. Even so, the Marine Corps considered that they had
proved the concept valid. They then began to develop further
doctrine, command and control procedures, and support meas-
ures to insure that new generations of V/STOL aircraft would
be able make optimum use of their unique capabilities.
Phase II. In May of 197 3 the Commandant of the Marine
Corps signed a Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) for an
advanced V/STOL aircraft. The objective of this SOR was pro-
curement of a light attack V/STOL aircraft with improved
range and pay load characteristics to replace all of the
Marine Corps 1 light attack planes, AV-8A*s and the A-4
Skyhawks, presently in the inventory. There would be several
benefits to this plan. The overall responsiveness of the
support to the ground commander would be greatly enhanced,
the number of aircraft types in the inventory would be de-
creased, and the number of aircraft requiring the SATS
expeditionary airfield* would be decreased.
Phase III. This phase is the very long range part of the
plan. During this phase a V/STOL fighter aircraft would be
developed and procured. When that is accomplished,
$ SATS is the Short Airfield for Tactical Support. This
is a small expeditionary airport used by the Marines that
can be carried on amphibious shipping or transported by air.




the conversion of the Marine air wings to V/STOL aircraft
exclusively will be complete.
The advanced V/STOL aircraft that the Marine Corps want-
ed in phase II of their plan was the AV-16A [Ref. 21: p.
49]. The AV-16A was to be an improved Harrier with a new
and more powerful engine. The new engine was to be an ad-
vanced version of the Pegasus 11 used in the AV-8A, to be
called the Pegasus 15. The AV-16A ran into some problems.
The Pegasus 15 was to be developed jointly by Britain and
the U.S., but the British said they could not afford to take
part in the development and pulled out of the program. The
Marines could not get funds to carry on the program by them-
selves, and the A7-16A project was cancelled [Ref. 22: p.
749]. In spite of the AV-1 6A setback, the Marine Corps was
still convinced that the V/STOL concept was sound and that
the Harrier was the current answer to providing the most
responsive close air support.
In addition to the Marine Corps 1 need, there were other
pressures for the further development of operational V/STOL
capabilities. With changing national committments, the re-
guirement for rapid entry into an isolated area and rapid
withdrawal after the mission is complete does not permit the
insertion and withdrawal of conventional fixed wing aviation
guickly enough to provide the continuous and responsive air
support needed by the maneuver elements [Ref. 21: p. 48].
Also, international political influences are forcing new as-
sessments of strategies and a search for weapons to carry
those strategies. As a result of these assessments, the
U.S. Navy as been spurred to look for new concepts for war
at sea and modernization of its weapons systems, including
the use of V/STOL jet aircraft. In Europe, the new technol-
ogy that was developing in the area of runway denial was
putting new emphasis on further development of jet V/STOL in
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order to avoid dependence on runways. There were efforts to
develop a bomb that would cause large areas of concrete to
heave and shatter rather than cause a crater, or a cluster-
type weapons that would scatter thousands of delayed-action
borablets along runways [ Ref . 4: p. 276]. Runway denial op-
erations such as these would shut down CTOL aircraft opera-
tions, but would have much less effect on V/STOL operations.
With all this pressure, the Marine Corps asked itself if
there was any way to get the advanced V/STOL they wanted
without having to depend on the development of a new engine,
which they couldn^t afford at the time. The answer to that
question was the A7-8B Advanced Harrier.
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Ill- THE MZ 8B ADVANCED HARRIER
A. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HARRIER
The Marine Corps was still acquiring AV-8A's when they
started planning for a growth version of the Harrier with
improved performance over the AV-8A. This second generation
Harrier was given the designation of AV-16A. The AV-16A
would achieve its improved performance over the AV-8A by us-
ing a more powerful engine, called the Pegasus 15, Two
American companies, McDonnell Douglas and Pratt & Whitney,
had a plan to develop that Harrier successor [Ref. 23: p.
58].
Earlier, when the Marine Corps decided to buy up to one
hundred more Harriers beyond the original twelve purchased
from Hawker Siddeley, McDonnell Douglas had tried to get a
license to produce the AV-8A*s in the United States
[Ref. 20: p. 1036]. They were unsuccessful in that attempt.
Congress determined that it would be uneconomical to set up
production in the United States for that small number of
aircraft (100), especially when the engines would be manu-
factured by Rolls Royce in England in any case. Based on
that analysis Congress disapproved McDonnell Douglas 1 re-
quest. Thus the Marines bought all their AV-8A*s from
Hawker Siddeley, which became a part of the nationalized
aircraft industry called British Aerospace. In 1972,
McDonnell Douglas and Pratt & Whitney intended to team with
Hawker Siddeley and Rolls Royce to design and produce the
AV-16A. The main features of the improved model, in addition
to the higher performance engine, were a new aerodynamically
improved wing and better takeoff performance. In 1973 the
U-S. Marine Corps submitted the Specific Operational
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Requirement for an advanced V/STOL light attack aircraft
with increased payload and range capability. The AV-16A was
the airplane the Marines had in mind [Ref. 24: p. 33].
Almost from the beginning it seemed unlikely that the
AV-16A would be approved. Because a brand new engine would
power it, the development program for the AV-16A would have
been complex and very expensive for the modest improvements
it would have brought. The project got off to a slow start
because the British government was having severe financial
difficulties during that time period. For two years Hawker
Siddeley and McDonnell Douglas worked together on the AV-16A
concept. During those two years The United States tried to
get the United Kingdom to enter a formal cooperation agree-
ment on the project [Ref. 2 3: p. 59]. According to the
terms of the proposed agreement, the United Kingdom would
contribute funds and share in development work, acting as an
equal partner with the United States, sharing equally the
risk and the profit. In June of 1974 the British Ministry
of Defence finally rejected the United States 1 cost sharing
offer. However, Great Britain still wanted an improved
Harrier. In May of 1975 the Minister of Defence announced
the decision of the British to go with the development of
another aircraft. The British were going for a low-risk de-
rivative of the standard Royal Air Force Harrier to be
called the Sea Harrier [Ref. 25: p. 1175]. A detailed cost
analysis showed that the development and production of the
Pegasus 15 engine solely in America would cost more than the
United States was willing to afford. The research and de-
velopment costs of the AV-16A were estimated at $900 mil-
lion, half of which would have been for the Pegasus 15
engine [Ref. 26: pp. 4789-4 790]. After a joint Navy-Marine
Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board (CEB) met to de-
cide the AV-16A question in 1975, the AV-16A project was
terminated [Ref. 26: p. 4790].
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In July of 1975 McDonnell Douglas announced that it
would develop an improved Barrier called the AV-8 + (AV-8
Plus) [Ref. 23: p. 57]. As advertised by McDonnell Douglas,
the AV-8+ would have the range, payload, and weapons carry-
ing capability to perform the mission of McDonnell Douglas 1
own A-4 Skyhawk, a light attack aircraft now in service with
the Marine Corps, Because the development of a new engine
was cost prohibative, the AV-8+ improvements had to be
achieved aerodynamically. The decision was made to incorpo-
rate the major aerodynamic features of the AV-16A into an
aircraft powered by the Pegasus 11 engine currently used in
the AV-8A. The designation AV-8+ was eventually dropped and
the McDonnell Douglas Advanced Harrier was designated the
AV-8B.
At the beginning of 197 5 there didn f t seem to be much
future for an advanced follow-on to the AV-8A, but by the
end of that year there was growing support for the AV-8B.
Over the next six years Mcdonnell Douglas worked with the
Marine Corps on the design of the AV-8B, and prototypes were
built and tested. During that period the United States was
still trying to get the United Kingdom to share in the
Advanced Harrier program. Finally, In July of 1981, the
United States and Great Britian completed negotiations to
establish a cooperative program for sharing in the develop-
ment and production of at least sixty McDonnell Douglas
AV-8B*s for the Royal Air Force. That agreement also provid-
ed for British Aerospace participation in a Marine corps
purchase of about 336 of the Advanced Harriers. The negotia-
tions concluded with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be-
tween the two governments [ Ref. 27: p. 63]. The MOU calls
the airframe work to be split 60% for McDonnell Douglas and
40% for British Aerospace, and the engine work to be split
75% for Rolls Royce and 25% for Pratt & Whitney. The costs
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for research and developmen t will be split 50-50. McDonnell
Douglas and British Aerospace will also collaborate in
world-wide marketing of the AV-8B when it becomes available
for export about 1985. Because the AV-8B is a McDonnell
Douglas design, the market share of any third country sales
will be 25* for British Aerospace and 75% for McDonnell
Douglas.
B. THE AV-8B IMPROVEMENTS
In order to make the improvements on the AV-8B substan-
tial enough to justify the expense of producing it r
McDonnell Douglas set out to apply as much state-of-the-art
technology as possible to the Advanced Harrier [ Ref . 28: p.






The biggest aerodynamic improvement is the new wing de-
signed for the AV-8B. The new wing design incorporates a su-
percritical airfoil developed by McDonnell Douglas. The
technology of the supercritical wing, designed to reduce
drag and increase the aerodynamic efficiency, was developed
for the AV-16A and tested extensively in the NASA/Ames tran-
sonic wind tunnel. The new wing is larger and has a higher
aspect ratio than the old wing. The new wing makes exten-
sive use of composite materials instead of being made com-
pletely of metal. Ose of the new composite material
technology means that more than 23% of the AV-8B airframe,
including some parts of the skin of the wing and fuselage
and some of the internal structure of the wing, are made of
graphite epoxy in addition to aluminum and titanium. The
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benefits of composite materials are that they have no known
fatigue life, they do not corrode, they are easier to re-
pair, and they are much lighter than aluminum [Ref. 29: p.
70]. The use of composite material saves over 300 pounds in
the overall weight of the airplane. Weight saving is impor-
tant in order to get AV-16A performance from an aircraft
with an AV-8A engine. There are several additional benefits
to having a larger and thicker wing on the AV-8B besides
more aerodynamic efficiency. One of these advantages is
that the internal fuel tanks can be larger. The AV-8B can
carry 2,000 pounds more fuel than the AV-8A. The larger and
stronger wing also enables the AV-8B to have seven pylons
for carrying external stores (bombs, missies, external fuel
tanks, etc.) compared to five on the AV-8A. The new wing
also gives the AV-8B a wider VIFF envelope [Ref. 29: p. 7U ].
VIFF stands for Vectoring In Forward Flight, and refers to
the technique pioneered by the U.S. Marine Corps of swivell-
ing the thrust nozzles of the Harrier while the aircraft is
in forward flight. Use of this technique can give the
Harrier a manuevering advantage over conventional aircraft.
The AV-8A has the capability to use 7IFF, but lacks the
structural strength to exploit the potential fully, which
the AV-8B will be able to do.
Several aerodynamic changes enable the AV-8B to improve
lift performance. The air intakes of the aircraft were al-
tered to make the air capture and throat areas larger to
give better air flow at low speeds and high power settings.
These alterations, plus some changes that allowed the tur-
bine entry temperature to be raised, and some modifications
to the exhaust nozzle design, increased the thrust of the
Pegasus 11 engine by about 1,00 pounds. Another signifi-
cant change is the addition of Lift Improvment Devices
(LID^s) [Ref. 28: p. 4], The LID^ are made up of a
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retractable "cross-dam" or fence that comes down across the
bottom of the fuselage, and two strakas, or long panels,
attached along the bottom of the fuselage. Together, the
fence and the strakes form a box with an open bottom. The
box formed by the LID^s counters a "suck-down" effect that
occurs in the AV-8A when the engine exhaust strikes the
ground, reverses direction and flows up around the fuselage
at high velocity. The high velocity air flow causes a low
pressure that tends to pull the aircraft down. The LID's
capture the reflected jet flow and convert some of that high
velocity flow into pressure that increases lift force.
Avionics changes in the Advanced Harrier include the ad-
dition of radar warning equipment, secure voice equipment,
and defensive electronic countermeasures equipment [ Ref . 24:
p. 74 ]. The AV-8B also has the Angle Rate Bombing System
(ARBS), now used on the latest version of the A-4 Skyhawk,
as part of an armament system that has been optimized for
the close air support mission. The ARBS allows the delivery
of ordnance with a much higher degree of accuracy than pre-
vious systems. The flexibility and accuracy of the ARBS
combines with the stores management system to provide a high
single pass kill probability along with low pilot workload
[Ref. 28: p. 10]. The AV-8 B also incorporates advanced con-
trol and display techniques, similar to those designed for
the F-18, to decrease the pilot workload [Ref. 30: p. 63].
One technique, called Hands On Throttle And Stick (HOTAS)
,
allows the pilot to perform many cockpit chores without re-
moving his hands from the primary controls. Another tech-
nique is an improved Heads Op Display (HOD) , which allows
the pilot to read his flight instruments and weapons aiming/
status displays without looking down into the cockpit.
Another change was the addition of a Stability Augmentation
and Attitude Hold System (SAAHS), which gives the pilot
30

steadier and more positive control of the aircraft with less
effort.
All of these improvements tested out well in the wind
tunnel, but could they be demonstrated on a flying airplane?
The AV-8B concept would have to be proven in flight before
any funds could be allocated for production.
C. TESTING OF THE AV-8B CONCEPT
In March of 1976 the Defense Systems Review Council
(DSAHC) recommended that the AV-8B program begin by having
McDonnell Douglas build two prototype Advanced Harriers
[Ref. 29: p. 75]. The prototype Advanced Harriers were
called YAV-SB's. The purpose of the prototype program was
to advance V/STOL technology and to verify the AV-8B design
concept prior to its next DSARC review in mid-1979. The
DSARC would decide at that time if the AV-8B would go into
full production. The flight demonstration phase of the
YAV-8B program was a thirty -three month effort lasting from
November 1976 until July 1979. The YAV-8B's were two con-
verted AV-SA^s, fitted with the AV-8B wing and a few of the
other improvements. The YAV-8B»s successfully demonstrated
the predicted performance and flying qualities of the im-
provements incorporated in them [Ref. 31: pp. 49-50]. All
of the required performance standards were either met or
exceeded.
During the late 1970's, as the Marines made their plans
for converting their light attack force to all 7/STOL by
phasing in AV-8B*s, a gap in Harrier service was discovered.
The original AV-SA^s then in service with the Marine Corps
were physically not going to last until they could all be
replaced by Advanced Harriers. Unless some corrective ac-
tion was taken, there would be a period during which the
Marine Air Wings would not have any Harriers in service.
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Because the YAV-8B improvements were so successful, plans
were made to extend the lives of the original AV-8A's
through a Conversion In Lieu Of Procurement (CILOP) program.
In this program, modifications similar to those of the
YAV-SB^ will be made on the AV-SA^ and they will be rede-
signated AV-8C*s. The iV-8C's will be transferred to the
Reserve Marine Air Ring as they are replaced by AV-8B f s.
[Ref. 32: p. 42 ]
As the YAV-8B prototype program progressed successfully,
the Marine Corps considered that having validated the 7/STOL
light attack concept with the AV-8A, the McDonnell Douglas
AV-8B would now provide the operational capability required
for its light attack force during the 1930's.
D. TH2 CONTROVERSY
In 1977 a controversy over the AV-8B program arose. The
U.S. Marine Corps wanted the Advanced Harrier for their
light attack force, but the program had opponents in the
Department of Defense. There was a fight in the Pentagon
over the AV-8B that was carried over to "the Hill." The
following chapters present the views of the major
participants in that fight.
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IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY VIEW
A- THE F/A-18 HORNET
The primary reason there was a controversy over the
AV-8B Advanced Harrier program was that some officials in
the Department of Defense felt that another airplane under
development for the Navy and the Marines, the McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, could fill the Marine 1 s light attack
requirement better than the AV-8B. In 197 1*, the Navy had
started to look for a new light weight multi-mission fighter
aircraft, and asked aircraft companies to submit their
ideas. Later that same year Congress directed the Navy to
investigate versions of the General Dynamics YF-16 and
Northrop YF-17 light weight fighter prototypes, then under
evaluation by the U.S. Air Force, instead of starting the
aquisition process from scratch on a whole new airplane
[Ref. 33: p. 384]. McDonnell Douglas, with its expertise in
building aircraft for the Navy, entered into an agreement
with Northrop to build a McDonnell Douglas/Northrop F-18
based on the Northrop YF-17. The F/A-18 was selected by the
Navy with McDonnell Douglas as the prime contracter and
Northrop as the associate contractor. The F/A-18 Hornet is
a conventional take-off and landing, single-seat, twin-en-
gined, carrier based, naval strike fighter. The Hornet has
both attack and f ighterver sions, hence its F/A designation.
The A-18 attack version is identical to the F-18 fighter
version except the attack version has a forward looking ra-
dar and a laser tracker for ground attack, that the fighter
version does not have, and the fighter version has fuselage
mounts for Sparrow air-to-air missiles that the attack ver-
sion does not have [Ref. 33: p. 384]. The first Hornet flew
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in September 1978, and the first production aircraft was de-
livered to the Navy in May 1980. See Appendix B for details
of the F/A-18.
B. THE MARINE CORPS' VIEW
During the time it was trying to aquire the AV-8B, the
Marine Corps was pursuing the following basic objectives for
Marine aviation [Ref. 34: p. 28]:
1. Support and improve current assets to achieve the
highest possible state of combat readiness.
2. Modernize and replace worn out assets with new weapon
systems and create new tactics to go along with them.
3. Optimize the task organization of the Marine Corps and
its weapon systems to provide the highest state of
combat readiness.
The most troublesome part of trying to achieve these objec-
tives for Marine aviation was to accomplish the second ob-
jective within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) of the Department of Defense [Ref. 34: p. 28].
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the Marine Corps in
1977, when the AV-8B controversy began, was Lieutenant
General Thomas H. Miller. As a Colonel, LtGen Miller had
been the first Marine to fly the Harrier. Talking about the
difficulty of moderninzing the aircraft inventory, LtGen
Miller stated:
It seems illogical to rebuild a budget annually
when weapon system development and procurement
takes ten to twelve years. The approval of weapon
system requirements (in size and capability) seems
to vary more on fiscal constraints than on the
need of ground forces to meet a threat. [Ref. 34:
p. 27]
Even though the modernizing task was a difficult one because
of fiscal constraints, the Marine Corps felt it was in a
strong position to accomplish modernization of a portion of
its air assets through the AV-8B program. One of the
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reasons the Marines were confident about the Advanced
Harrier program was that the Marines thought they had the
most efficient aviation arm within the Department of Defense
[Ref. 35: pp. 50-51], and that this should entitle them to
some special consideration at a time when they wanted a uni-
que aircraft to satisfy their special needs. In the
Marine* s view, they had taken a small portion of the overall
national military assets and formed them into an air-ground
team capable of meeting almost any threat around the world.
The Marine Corps was providing 15* of the nation* s tactical
air capabilities for only 9 * of the budget. Even though the
Marine Air Wings were operating approximately 28* of the
Navy Departments aircraft, the Marines didn*t feel that
they were getting a fair share of aviation money from the
Navy [Ref. 36: p. 44]. See Table I for figures on the
TABLE I
Marine Share of Navy Aircraft Procurement
Y76 FY77 FY7 8 FY79 FY80 FY81
8* 18* 9* 12* 16* 4*
Percentage recieved by the Marine Corps
of all dollars that buy airplanes
Marine Corps* share of aircraft dollars. Because the Marine
Corps received procurement and operation money for its avia-
tion assets through the Navy (what the Marine*s call "Blue
Dollars'*), it was usually difficult to fund high priority
Marine aviation programs that were competing against Navy
priorities for scarce money resources. If a "fair share"
allocation were to be used, based on a percentage of assets
owned by each service, then the overall investment options
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of the Navy Department would be reduced. After a "fair
share" split, neither service would have sufficient funds
available for commitment to major programs. The Marine
Corps felt that if a "fair share" basis could not be used,
then there should come a time when high priority Marine avi-
ation programs should receive top priority within the
Department of the Navy. The AV-8B program was the highest
priority program in Marine aviation [ Ref . 37: p. 56]. The
AV-8B was the key to the long range goal of Marine aviation
to convert to an all V/STOL force. The first step in that
conversion was to get an all V/STOL light attack force. The
Marine Corps 1 plan was to have its whole light attack force,
consisting of A-4M*s and AV-8A 1 s, replaced with Advanced
Harriers commencing in 1985. That transition would be com-
pleted by 1990, when the Marine Corps 1 light attack force
would be made up of eight squadrons of twenty AV-8B*s each.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Louis H. Wilson,
told Congress that he would prefer to risk a fighter gap in
the 1980's by not buying F- 18*s to replace aging P-4
Phantoms, if it would speed the Corps 1 switch to the all
V/STOL era [Ref. 38: p. 25].
Another reason the Marine*s thought they were in a
strong position for procuring the advanced Harrier was that
they were thoroughly convinced that their V/STOL concept was
proven, and that the AV-8B was needed to enable them to con-
tinue to employ that concept. LtGen Miller said:
I don't think anyone can question, our nearly eight
years of experience with the Harrier because there
is no other military service, particularly in the
United States that has any comparable experience.
We consider our success with the Harrier a total
success in providing the kind of air support we
feel our young Marine on the ground needs ...
[Ref. 35: p. 53]
Yet another reason to be confident was that the Marine
Corps fully expected McDonnell Douglas to demonstrate con-
clusively with the TAV-8B prototype program that the V/STOL
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concept was here to stay [Ref. 34: p. 29]. The Marines were
confident that after testing the improvements incorporated
in the YAV-8B's, the results would silence the critics who
said the AV-8A was not able to perform its mission because
of shortcomings in range and payload capabilities. The
Marine Corps recognized that the AV-8A, as a first genera-
tion aircraft, had some undesirable features such as low
range and small payloads. One purpose of the AV-8B program
was to correct those deficiencies as well as incorporate
modern systems with better reliability and maintainability.
Colonel Stanley Lewis, a program manager for the Advanced
Harrier program, stated, "Ue're getting everything McDonnell
Douglas promised in the V/S TOL regime." [Ref. 31: p. 50] The
AV-8B was an evolutionary development based on the AV-8A op-
erational experience, but it was not an experiment. This
second generation V/STOL was expected to provide the full
close air support capability required by the Marines.
[Ref. 11: p. 59]
When Marine units were assigned duties with the Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) , the Marine Corps felt the case for
the AV-8B was strengthened [Ref. 39: pp. 1-5]. The AV-8B
would have many features that would make it an excellant RDF
aircraft:
1. The Harrier's basing flexibility would enable it to
operate independent of any foreign airfields.
2. If it were operating from an airfield with other RDF
aircraft, it would have the capability to continue to
takeoff from taxiways, ramps, or even nearby roads if
the runways were choked with transport aircraft during
resupply missions.
3. RDF aircraft require long ferry ranges. The AV-8B
could ferry from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
at Cherry Point, North Carolina to Cyprus in the
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Eastern Mediterranean in less than sixteen hours, with
three one-hour turnaround servicings (which could be
skipped with aerial refueling). The AV-8B could ferry
from the El Toro, California MCAS to Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean in twenty-nine hours (twenty-four
hours flight time).
4. The AV-8B is NATO compatible. It can accept consuma-
bles and weapons available at NATO bases, and it is
compatible with NATO communications and aircraft turn-
around servicing facilities.
5. Starting power, electric power, and hydraulic power
are all provided by onboard systems. The AV-8B also
has an onboard oxygen generating system which elimi-
nates the transfer and filling reguirments for high
pressure liquid oxygen bottles.
No single tactical aircraft combines all of the desired op-
erational capabilities for effective rapid deployment, but
the AV-8B is a light attack aircraft with excellant support-
ability and a degree of basing flexibility that is unique to
V/STOL aircraft [Ref. 39: p. 6].
The overall Navy Department aircraft procurement situ-
ation at the time of the A7-8B controversy was not very
good. LtGen Miller stated in 1980:
Naval aviation needs about 320 aircraft per year
to maintain its present force level. Since Marine
aviation is about one- third of Naval aviation, we
need about 100 aircraft per year to keep our air-
craft inventory at its present level. With Navy
procurement way below the 320 aircraft needed an-
nually, it's fairly widely recognized that if the
Navy and the Marine Corps, in the near future,
don't start buiding up procurement each year, we
simply won*t be able to perform our mission.
[Ref. 40: pp. 46-47]
The Marines were already starting to feel that pinch.
Because the Office cf the Secretary of Defense (OSD) cut
AV-8B program funding in half during the PY1979 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) portion of PPBS, the Marine Corps
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planned to reduce the number of AV-8A*s in each squadron
from twenty to fifteen by the end of FY79 and at the same
time increase the number of A-4M*s in each squadron from
sixteen to nineteen in order to keep the light attack force
at 140 aircraft [Ref. 41: p. 49]. But that would have been a
difficult solution to carry out because the A-4M was going
out of production in February 1979 [Ref. 33: p. 390]. There
was no question that the Navy and the Marines needed many
more modern aircraft. The controversy was over what types of
aircraft were going to fill those needs.
In 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown ordered the
Marine Corps to do a cost/effectiveness study of the A- 18
and AV-8B attack aircraft. Later that study was moved to
the Secretary of the Navy»s Office for Programs and Analysis
[Ref. 42: p. 18]. The Secretary of the Navy formed a
Navy-Marine team which included members of the OPNAV and
Marine Headquarters staffs, Naval Air Systems Command, and
the Center for Naval Analyses to do this study [Ref. 43: p.
5082]. The study is entitled An Evaluation of the
Comparative Cost-Ef fecti ven ess of the AV-8B and A-JJ3
Aircraft In S upport of Marine Corj>s Light Attack
Requirements Includin g Amphibio us Operations , and is common-
ly known as the 8-18 Study. The study was based on the
V/STOL concept of operations, including logistics support ,
developed by the Marine Corps and tested by the operational
experience gained with the AV-8A, and was keyed to close air
support of an amphibious operation. Amphibious scenarios
included in the study were the Middle East, Korea, Jutland,
the Persian Gulf, and various sea lines of communications
actions. Sensitivity analyses were run to vary operating
modes, weapons used, target mixes, and target appearance
rates. The conventional, centralized offensive air support
by CTOL aircraft from an expeditionary (SATS) or carrier
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(CV) airbase was compared with dispersed site operations of
V/STOL aircraft from both CV and air-capable amphibious
ships and V/STOL sites and facilities ashore. [Ref. 43: pp.
5082-5083] The key points of the cost analysis portion of
the study were [Ref. 43: pp. 5084-5085]:
1. The cost analysis compared the mix of twelve F-18
fighter-attack squadrons and eight AV-8B light attack
squadrons requested by the Marine Corps with the twen-
ty squadrons of F-18*s proposed by the Secretary of
Defense.
2. Ten- and fifteen-year life cycle costs were examined.
3. The factors that tended to drive up the cost of the
A- 18 and drive down the cost of the AV-8B were:
a) The large airframe of the A- 18 and small airframe
of the AV-8B.
b) Two engines in the A-18 and only one engine in the
AV-8B.
c) A medium amount of avionics in the A-18 and a low
amount in the AV-8B.
4. The factors that tended to drive up the cost of the
AV-8B and drive down the cost of the A-18 were:
a) A buy of 1160 A-18»s versus a buy of 366 AV-8B»s.
b) The research and development costs of the A-18 were
sunk costs, whereas the research and development
costs of the AV-8B were still ahead.
c) The A-18 has common siting (CV or airfield) while
the AV-8B is operated in dispersed detachments (sea
base, forward sites, facilities, etc.).
The main points of the effectiveness analysis portion of the
study were [Ref 43: pp. 5085-5087]:
1. Factors that make the A-18 an effective aircraft:
a) It carrys a larger payload.
b) It has longer range and endurance.
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c) It has a very accurate ground attack weapons
system.
d) It is a swing fighter, that is r it can be used in
an air-to-air role as well as close air support.
e) It has increased reliability because of twin
engines.
2. Factors that make the AV-8B an effective aircraft:
a) It operates closer to the supported units.
b) It utilizes ground loiter rather than air loiter.
c) It has the shortest response time.
d) It has greater deployment flexibility.
e) Its base survivability is greater.
3. Required response times for three targets were derived
from many previous studies and combat experience. The
response basis was that the attacking aircraft must
respond within 30 minutes or less to have any effect.
Target value begins to decay when the target begins to
inflict casulties on supported units.
4. One measure of effectiveness was based on a comparison
of target value kills versus the appearance on target
rate of each aircraft. In this comparison the AV-8B
was based at an average distance of approximately
thirty-seven miles from the Forward Edge of the Battle
Area (FEBA) utilizing ground loiter from forward
sites, while the A-18 was based an average of 125
miles from the FEBA utilizing air loiter near the
FEBA. This comparison showed that a forward based
small aircraft is equal to a large rear based aircraft
in effectiveness with reduced logistics costs.
5. Another measure of effectiveness was conduct of opera-
tions from bases under threat raids. In this compari-
son the bases used by the two aircraft were subjected
to runway interdiction raids using airbase detection
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probability results from NATO flight tests. As a re-
sult of the raids, the A- 18 effectiveness was degraded
approximately 30% and the AV-8B effectiveness was only
degraded by about 12%. This comparison showed that
the reliability of sortie generation capability is
much higher with V/STOL aircraft utilizing a dispersal
concept in a contested area.
6. Another measure of effectiveness studied was the rela-
tive effectiveness compared to the fraction of the the
light attack force used for close air support and in-
terdiction. The total force used for the study had a
light attack force of 160 aircraft, which was the
Marine Corps 1 objective at the time the study was
done. If the force was used totally for anti-air war-
fare, meaning no aircraft used for close air support
or interdiction, then the A-18 mix was more effective
because of its fighter capability. As the light attack
force is committed to close air support and interdic-
tion missions to the extent of about 40% to 50% of all
sorties, then the AV- 8B mix becomes superior and con-
tinues to be better as the committment to close air
support and interdiction is increased. The Marine
Corps normally programs 85% of its light attack sor-
ties for close air support.
The main conclusions drawn from the 8-18 study were [ Ref
.
44: pp. 7-8]:
1. The life-cycle costs of the two alternatives were
equal for both the 10-year and 15-year cycles.
2. The overall relative effectiveness of the two systems
is heavily dependent on scenarios and employment
assumptions.
3. In the close air support target scenario analyzed, the
AV-8B was substantially more effective and, because of
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its flexibility in basing, is more likely to be more
effective on a scenario independent basis.
With all their confidence in the AV-8B program the
Marine Corps continued to push the program in the Pentagon.
The Marines also carried the fight on to Capital Hill in
testimony before various committees of both houses of
Congress. Marine general officers repeatedly stressed the
Marine Corps view of the AV-8B program to Congress. General
Louis H. Wilson, when he was the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, testified about what the Harrier* s unique 7/STOL ca-
pability added to responsiveness, survivability, and the
ability of the Marines to carry out their mission:
and
and
We feel that the AV-8B , a V/STOL capability and
the only V/STOL development in this nation, would
Srovide effectively for the modernization of our
ight attack force. I am pleased to report that
prototype development of the YAV-8B has been prog-
ressing smoothly... Regrettably, funding con-
straints required that the R&D funds for
continuing the AV-8B program be deleted from the
fiscal year 1980 budget. [Ref. 45: p. 930]
I believe the AV-8B is a technology which is the
only V/STOL in this nation now. We believe it is a
fine aircraft for the Marine Corps. It gives us a
new dimension for close air support for the young
Marine on the ground... It has one and a half
times the capability of the A-4 which we have
now... We know that the enemy, when we move in
anywhere, will go for the airfields. This plane
can provide support without airfield support.
[Ref: 45: p. 940 ]
The V/STOL capability resident in the AV-8B is
crucial to the ability to project Naval power
ashore through forcible entry without being tied
to airfields. This V/STOL capability enables the
Marine Corps to rapidly phase its Close Air
Support (CAS) assets ashore. Additionaly, V/STOL
capability permits the exercise of forward site
basing options which will place CAS assets in
close proximity to the forward lines. Close prox-
imity can be directly translated to reduced re-
sponse time - CAS directly on call by the
supported ground commander. Supported in this
way, the ground commander can concurrently in-
crease the combat capability and survivability of




In response to questions from members of Congress, General
Wilson stressed how important the Advanced Harrier was to
the Marines and what priority the Marine Corps gave the
AV-8B relative to the F/A-1 8:
Senator Hart, General, if fiscal reality com-
pe"2Te3-teTl!nation of either the AV-8B or the
F-18, in your personal opinion, which program
should be terminated, if it is necessary to termi-
nate one of them?
General Wilson. Well, that is like saying which
ofyour clfilaTen are you going to give up. Senator
Hart.
Senator Hart. We can be cruel.
General Wilson. I need not elaborate on that. Of
coursewe ODviously need the F-18 as much as we
need the AV-8B for our attack aircraft. But I tes-
tified last year, and I believe this still holds,
if I am pushed to the point, toward which I am now
being pushed, we could hold off on our moderniza-
tion of our fighters. Therefore, I would take the
AV-8B.
Now on the other hand, that implies that there
is going to be another fighter, and we have no in-
dication now that there is anything better than




Senat or Hart. I think I can spot an equivocation.
Thahk""7ouT—"[Ref . 46: p. 535]
Senator Cannon. General Wilson, what priority is
tne IV-8B~pr*o*g'ram overall relative to other Marine
Corps 1 programs?
Gen eral Wilson. The AV-8B program was and would
Be~ly Tiigires^~priority for aviation programs.
[Ref. 46: p. 545 ]
Senator Nunn. General Wilson, in your opinion
What~T3 the result of the Marines 1 eight years ex-
perience of operating the AV-8A Harrier?
General Wilson. We have conducted AV-8A opera-
tions around the world
,
both ashore and at sea. We
have operated the Harrier in the deserts of
California, the tropics of the Philippines, the
Artie conditions of the North Atlantic and Canada,
and in Korea, Australia, Germany, Denmark and
Kenya. These operations prove to our satisfaction
the advantages of V/STOL in close air support any-
where, anytime from the most austere bases, with
high sortie rates; immediate response to the needs
of Marines on the ground; conduct of operations
from damaged airfilds; increased survival of air-
craft and crews by dispersion to several sites.
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Our operational experience tells me, in short,
that the Marines and this country need the AV-8B.
[Ref. 46: p. 553 ]
The Commandant's testimony was reinforced by testimony given
by Lieutenant General Thomas H. Miller, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Marine Corps for Air under General Wilson.
LtGen Miller testified about the importance of the AV-8B
program as a part of Marine Corps 1 V/STOL objectives:
Consistent with our experience with. the helicopter
in Korea and South Vietnam, the basing flexibility
offered by the helicopter* s V/STOL characteristics
clearly point the way for improving the respon-
siveness of our vital heavy airborne fire support
for the ground combat Marine. In 1971, some 8
years ago, the Marine Corps was provided and com-
menced operating the free worlds only high per-
formance V/STOL tactical aircraft the British
Harrier, or AV-8A. After 8 years of operating this
unique aircraft in almost every known environment,
both in support of ground forces and in many other
missions on land and at sea. the Marine Corps con-
siders this type of aircraft system to be most vi-
tal and of unqualified success. The AV-8B was
envisioned to continue the evolutionary develop-
ment of an improved version of the AV-8A in the
same manner that has been done with conventional
fixed-wing aircraft since the Wright Brothers
first flew, and with helicopters since they wre
first used in the Marine Corps in the late 1940*3
and early 1950«s. [Ref. 47: p. 994]
As the controversy continued over several years. General
Wilson retired and the Marine Corps got a new Commandant,
General Robert H. Barrow. The new Commandant continued to
express the Marine Corps view of the AV-8B to Congress. In
1980, General Barrow repeated in his testimony how important
the Marine Corps thought the Advanced Harrier was to them:
Senator Stennis. General Barrow, is the AV-8B
program ot a l"5wer priority to the Marine Corps
than all of the programs included in the submitted
fiscal year 1981 budget?
General Barrow. It certainly is not, Mr.
Ch"airma"n^ Th"e"""AV-8B remains our highest priority
aviation program. Unfortunately, funding con-
straints make it impossible for everyone in the
Department of Defense to agree on the priority of
many programs. [Ref. 48: p. 854]
and
Sen ator Cannon. General Barrow, does the Marine
Corps~i"uHy~support the AV-8B program?
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General Barrow, The Marine Corps views this pro-
gYal""a"s" e"s~s*e"n"7ial to modernize and maintain the
Marine Corps light attack force through the re-
mainder of the centurv, and is the highest priori-
ty program in Marine Corps aviation... The
primary mission of this force is to provide close
air support to the ground combat element of the
Marine Air Ground Task Force; therefore, the air-
craft in its present configuration is optimized
for that mission. [Ref. 48: p. 860]
The Marine Corps 1 priority for the AV-8B relative to the
F/A-18 and its opinion of which aircraft was better suited
for Marine Corps requirements remained consistent also:
Senator Cannon. General Barrow, what would the
"Harine~Corps~T5e willing to give up in the fiscal
J
ear 1981 budget to fund the requirement for the
V-8B?
General Barrow. He feel that the cost of the
]?7^=,nrrs earmarked for the Marine light attack
force should be used to fund the AV-8B
requirement. [Ref. 48: p. 860]
and
and
Senator Nunn. What is your assesment of the AV-8B
progra"! "£o"~aate and your position on its value to
the Marine Corps' ability to perform your
missions?
General Barrow. The Flight Demonstration Program
at Nav*al"Tir~"Test Center Patuxent River has proved
the technical competance of the YAV-8B. The air-
craft has met or exceeded all contract demonstra-
tion points; in short, it has shown in flight that
it can do everything we want it to do. All the
characteristics of the AV-8B - range, payload, re-
sponsiveness, flexibility, to name but a few - are
just what we are looking for in a light attack
aircraft. My position. Senator Nunn. remains the
same: I want an all V/STOL light attack force of
AV-SB^ for the Marina Corps because I think it
will fill our requirements as no other aircraft
can. [Ref. 48: p. 863 ]
Senator Thurmond. General, would you compare the
IV-8"and tne r- i 8 ground attack capabilities.
Gen eral Barrow. First, the ground attack capabil-
ities ofTle"I7-8B must be associated with the
primary mission for which the aircraft has been
designed, that of close air support. The aircraft
incorporates systems and capabilities based on
data gained through years of close air support ex-
perience and extensive employment of the V/STOL
concept via the AV-8A. The effectiveness provided
by the passive and highly accurate Angle Rate
Bombing System (ARBS) will give the AV-8B a dis-
tinct advantage over the F/A-18 in the Close Air
Support role. The basing flexibility, both aboard




sites, damaged runways. roads r etc.) , and its
capability to respond to the ground commander pro-
vides the AV-8B an effectiveness not available
from the F/A-18. A pointed example of the AV-8's
flexibility resulted from the Harrier's perform-
ance in the recent exercise "Display
Determination" in Turkey, While conventional air-
craft were "weathered in" for two days at a main
airfield (burdened as well with logistical air
traffic saturation and simulated enemy interdic-
tion strikes) , the AV-8's staged from an off shore
LPH to remote forward sites and provided continu-
ous air support throughout the period. [Ref. 48:
p. 905]
Mr, Edwards.. Has the Marine Corps solicited the
opinions of its aviators on this subject? Do the
men who will fly in combat agree that the AV-8B is
the way to go?
General Barrow. The Marine Corps, like other ser-
vices, develops weapon system reguirements on the
basis of the current and projected threat and
technology, among other things. The staffs which
develop these weapon systems are made up of expe-
rienced aviators who will return to the fleet when
they leave this area, In short, new aircraft are
guided through the wickets of development and pro-
curement by the same people who expect to fly them
in combat. The pilots who have been flying the
AV-8A for the past nine years are more than enthu-
siastic about AV-8B. [Ref. 49: p. 663]
C. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT POR THE MARINE VIEW
Congress responded positively to the Marine Corps' pres-
entation of its view of the AV-8B decision by restoring
funding reguested by the Marines that had been cut from the
President's budget by OSD when the controversy first began,
and later by adding procurement funds to the President's
budget when none were reguested. When the Department of
Defense first took action against the Advanced Harrier pro-
gram by cutting its funding in half for fiscal year 1979,
Congress returned it to full funding [Ref. 34: p. 53]. This
set the pattern for years to follow, whenever the Marines'
reguest for AV-8B funding was cut from the President's budg-
et, that funding would be restored by Congress. The House of




Witnesses representing the Marine Corps testified
that the Harrier program is one of its highest
friorities for fiscal year 1981. The Congress has,
or several years, supported the development of
this aircraft that is now ready for production...
The Committee, in continuing support for this very
important program, recommends $90,000,000 for
long-lead procurement which has been included in
the fiscal year 1981 authorization conference
agreement. [Ref. 50: p. 248]
As has been the case in the past, the Navy did not
reguest funds for the AV-8B, and the Marine Corps
testified to the need for developing this V/STOL
capability. It continues to be the Committee^ be-
lief that vigorous pursuit of the AV-8B is the
only viable and logical way of obtaining a V/STOL
aircraft for our forces in the near future.
[Ref. 50: p. 307]
Some senators were concerned about what impact termination
of the AV-8B program would have on the future of V/STOL
technology in the United States. Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr. said, "We would yield the promising V/STOL
field to Great Britain and the Soviet Onion." [Ref. 42: p.
18] Senator Williams was also concerned about terminating
the program for an aircraft manufactured in the United
States:
Not only wil}. this mean more jobs for Americans,
but it will insure that we have the technology and
the manufacturing capability for V/STOL aircraft
in the United States. [Ref. 4 2: p. 18]
Other senators were concerned about the AV-8B program be-
cause they saw a future for V/STOL aircraft in the U.S.
Navy. Senator Patrick Leahy said, "While the Advanced
Harrier is currently planned as a Marine Corps aircraft, its
real importance in the future will be as a naval aircraft."
[Ref. 42: p. 18]
D. THE U.S. NAVY VIEW
The U.S. Navy view of the AV-8B program had many
aspects. The Navy was concerned about their own plans for
integrating V/STOL or VTOL aircraft into the Navy, and what
impact the AV-8B program might have on those plans. Within
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the wide scope of naval aviation, the Navy was concerned
about what impact the AV-8B program would have on other avi-
ation programs providing aircraft for strictly Navy use, as
well as the needs of Marine Corps aviation, a part of naval
aviation.
The Navy's plan for incorporating their own V/STOL air-
craft has had many ups and downs. The Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) in 1977, Admiral James L. Holloway III,
stated:
In the spring of 1975, I reviewed the status of
V/STOL ana V/STOL ship programs... I concluded
that the failure of V/STOL resulted primarily from
the fact that the V/STOL programs were competing
for aviation program funds with patrol and carrier
planes. [ Ref . 51: p. 21]
So, even though the V/STOL program was having a tough time
getting going in the Navy, the benefits of having all sea-
based, manned, tactical aircraft converted to V/STOL were
well understood [Ref. 51: p. 21]. These benefits were:
1. Manned tactical air could be expanded throughout the
fleet to a much greater degree, enabling surface com-
batants to attain new capabilities.
2. The design of future carriers could become much more
flexible without the reguirement for angled decks, ov-
erhang, arresting gear, and high-capacity catapults.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) conducted
a study, completed in the spring of 1976, that concluded it
was possible to develop and produce V/STOL aircraft which
could fulfill the future reguiremenns of Navy sea-based,
manned, tactical aircraft [ Ref. 51: p. 22]. Based on this
study and the conclusions made by the CNO, a plan was devel-
oped that called for the replacement of conventional air-
craft models, at the normal expiration of their service
life, with V/STOL follow-on aircraft. Those follow-on air-
craft would use the current inventory of CTOL aircraft car-
riers until an all-V/STOL naval air force made pure V/STOL
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carriers feasible. The Navy had a full inventory of CTOL
carriers, and these could be used just as well for V/STOL
operations as V/STOL airplanes were phased in, but a pure
V/STOL carrier would not be able to operate CTOL aircraft.
another long-term Navy objective to be accomplished with
this plan was to reduce the number of different aircraft
types in the Navy and the Marine Corps [Ref. 51: p. 22].
This would be accomplished by limiting fixed-wing V/STOL de-
signs to two basic types [Ref. 52: p. 44 and Ref. 51: p.
23]:
1. Type A - fairly large, subsonic, multimission, multi-
place, and sensor-carrying for the Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) , Carrier On Board Delivery (COD)
,
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) , and tanker missions.
2. Type B - smaller than Type A and supersonic, for the
fighter and attack missions.
The Navy was divided on the program of V/STOL develop-
ment [Ref. 52: pp. 44-45]. The surface Navy was enthusias-
tic about V/STOL because of the new capabilities it would
bring to the surface fleet. The surface combatants offen-
sive power could be increased by mating a V/STOL over-the-
horizon detection, tracking, and targeting capability,
carried on and launched from their own ships, with surface-
launched, air-targeted, long-range missiles fired from their
ships. This would extend their offensive capability far be-
yond what was possible using only radar.
While the surface Navy was in favor of V/STOL, Naval
aviators had mixed views of V/STOL developments. Many Naval
aviators were not in support of V/STOL because of a variety
of reasons:
1. There were conservatives who did not want to change
from a proven system (CTOL aircraft, large carriers)




2. Some viewed V/STOL as a threat to carrier aviation's
place of supreme importance in the Navy, and they
thought this would somehow decrease their career
prospects.
3. Some felt that the future of naval aviation was in
projection of power ashore as Naval aviation had oper-
ated in World War II in the Pacific, in Korea, and in
Vietnam. CTOL aircraft can carry large payloads over
long ranges and would be superior to present V/STOL
aircraft in such a situation.
Other naval aviators were in support of V/STOL aircraft and
the smaller carriers that would carry them, because it was
becoming increasingly evident that each large CTOL carrier
represents an extremely high value target to the enemy, and
that too much combat power is concentrated in one ship with
these large modern carriers [Ref. 52: p. 46].
This new V/STOL plan of the Navy»s was, of course, a
long range plan because the V/STOL Type A and B aircraft did
not exist, and would not for fifteen or twenty years. Some
planners in Washington were in favor of the more immediate
option of having the Navy concentrate on the development of
a Harrier derivative aircraft for purely naval roles
[Ref. 52: p. 47]. In 1977 a study was presented to the
Secretary of the Navy, W. Sraham Claytor, Jr., that looked
into the feasibility of using a Navy version of the AV-8B.
The study looked at what avionics would be necessary for the
AV-8B to serve in several different roles with air-to-sur-
face and limited air-to-air capability, as well as what the
propulsion system requirements were, what aircraft perform-
ance was needed, and what the cost estimates were for devel-
opment and production [Ref. 42: p. 18]. The estimated cost
for development of the "Nav alized" Harrier was $1.2 billion,
$28 5 million for the engine and $933 million for the
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airframe [Ref. 53: p. 5107]. This proposed Navy version of
the Harrier was called the AV-8B+ (AV-8B Plus), If the Navy
had decided to adopt the AV-8B+, the Marine's position on
the Advanced Harrier would have been strengthened because
495 more AV-8B* s would have been produced and their unit
cost decreased. But, the Navy did not pursue the AV-8B+ for
several reasons. One reason was that funding constraints
would would have made it very difficult for the Navy to en-
ter the AV-8B program while financing the F/A-18. Senior
Navy officials said that the AV-8B is a credible light at-
tack aircraft for the fleet, but it doesn't fit because it
competes with the F/A-18 for scarce funds [Ref. 54: p. 56].
The possibility of a Navy AV-8B+ surfaced again later when
the Navy began to make plans for the reactivation of four
battleships. There was a possibility that the Navy might
procure the AV-8B* for use on the battleships. The Senate
Armed Services Committee added money to the Fiscal Year 1982
authorization bill for the development of systems for the
AV-8B + , but the House Armed Services Committee did not
[Ref. 55: p. 60]. There are still no firm plans for the
AV-8B+. One of the major reasons the Navy was reluctant to
support the Marine's AV-8B program was its concern that it
would be forced into an AV-8B+ aircraft that it did not re-
ally want [Ref. 42: p. 18]. One of the reasons that the
Harrier might not be the right design for the Navy is that
the basic Harrier design has physical limitations that could
keep it from being fully exploited into the supersonic re-
gion. Also, the A7-8B*s lift/cruise design gives it very
good performance with a short take-off, but limits its per-
formance in vertical take-off. The Navy would rely more on
vertical take-off capability for operations from ships such
as frigates and destroyers. [Ref. 52: p. 47] A third reason
for the reluctance to join the AV-8B program is the Navy*s
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range and payload requirements. The Marine Corps can live
with the reduced range/payl oad of the AV-8B relative to CTOL
aircraft. Reduced range /pa yload is the trade-off for V/STOL
capability. Because the basing flexibility gained with the
Harrier allows it tc perform its close air support mission
more rapidly it is suited to the Marine Corps, but the
Navy's mission requirements demand greater ranges and larger
pay loads on the open sea where a basing trade-off is not
possible. [Ref. 12: pp. 25-26]
A main concern of the Navy, at the time the AV-8B con-
troversy was going on, was the problem of maintaining the
force level in Naval aviation discussd before. While the
Navy essentially supported the Marinas in thier fight for
the AV-8B, the Navy was waging its own battle with the
Department of Defense over what aircraft it was going to ac-
quire for its own needs. The Navy was concerned about what
impact the Marine's AV-8B program would have on other pro-
grams providing Navy aircraft. The Department of the Navy
preference for Naval aviation aircraft in 1977 was to have
an all F-14 fighter force, an A-18 Navy light attack force,
an F-18 Marine fighter force, and an AV-8B Marine light at-
tack force [Ref. 56: p. 14*]. Just two years later, severe
money constraints forced the Navy to look at other options,
including a request to terminate the F/A-18 program
[Ref. 57: p. 41]. But the program was not terminated, and
the Navy got the F/A-18 anyway. Under Secretary of the Navy
R. James Woolsey, in discussing the continuation of the
F/A-18 program, stated:
Inventories must, of course, be sustained, but the
dominant consideration is best use of limited re-
sources to buy the mission capability required to
meet the projected threat according to rational
priorities. [Ref. 58: p. 42]
The Navy did not believe that the F/A-18 was an affordable
program, and rather than let the aircraft inventories become
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depleted, because the numbers of aircraft needed could not
be afforded, they developed several options to get airplanes
they thought would allow them to accomplish their mission,
while staying within the tight budget constraints being im-
posed on them at the time by the Department of Defense. The
Navy's basic plan was to by-pass the F/A-18, filling re-
quirements with less costly aviation programs until V/STOL
replacements could come along [ Ref . 57: p. 41], Under this
plan the Navy would have all F-14»s for its fighter force,
keep A-7»s for its light attack force, keep F-4's as long as
possible for the Marine fighter force, and aguire AV-8B's
for the Marine light attack force. The Navy held that the
F-18 was not a lower cost substitute for the F-14, but a
lower capability substitute. In a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense, Woolsey said, "...10 F-14's are as
good or better than 12 F-18's." [Ref. 58: p. 43] The Navy
also maintained that the only advantage that the A-18 had
over the A-7, the light attack aircraft then in service with
the Navy, was greater agility in post-attack retirement
(getting away from the target area after delivering its ord-
nance), which the A-18 gained at a significant trade-off in
range and payload compared to the A-7 [Ref. 58: p. 43]. The
Navy backed the Marine Corps in its choice of an F-4 and
AV-8B mix over an F-18 and A-18 mix if the Marines could not
have its first choice of F-18*s and AV-8B»s. The Navy main-
tained that even though it really didn't like the idea of
extending the life of the F-4*s with another Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) , it was the best option that could
be afforded. Because the Marine fighter mission was more one
of maintaining air superiority than initially establishing
it, and because newer missiles that were soon to be in ser-
vice would shift capability emphasis from the platform (F-4
or F-18) to the weapons being carried, the Navy felt the F-4
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could continue to fulfill the Marine fighter requirement
[Ref. 58: p. 43 ]. The Navy*s position on the AV-8B was
stated by Mr. Woolsey in his memorandum to Secretary Brown:
We, too, respect and are impressed by the
Commandants strong conviction in regard to the
AV-8B. It is of central importance to our recom-
mendation that the AV-8B is the right choice for
the Marine light attack force--. We concluded
that, given the purpose for which the Marine light
attack force is intended and the tactics and meth-
ods of applications which the Marines, based on
their plans and experience, expect to use, the
Commandants conviction is justified. The AV-8B is
definitely preferable for the Marine light attack
role. [Reff 58: p. 43 ]
The main point of the Navy»s plan to terminate the F/A-18
program was that their alternative would save $2 billion
over the following five years. The Navy's position was sum-
med up as follows:
the F/A-18 provides some capabilities that we
would like to have, in light of the fiscal con-
straints we surely face- it is far preferable to
terminate it than to suffer the disproportionate
loss in other aviation and non-aviation programs
which otherwise seem inevitable. [Ref. 58: p. 44]
Even though the Chief of Naval Operations and officials
in the office of the Secretary of the Navy were in support
of the AV-8B for the Marine Corps, there were other Navy of-
ficials that were not sure that the Navy could afford the
Advanced Harrier. These officials were looking ahead to the
mid-^SO's and they were worried about how the Navy was go-
ing to afford several types of aircraft during that time.
Vice Admiral F.C Turner, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Air Warfare) said:
We have been faulted in the past for buying too
many types, too small a buy, and so forth. That
was clearly true- but there are some good reasons
why that occurred. First, as we all know, we have
two services, the Navy and the Marine Corps. Years
ago, we could afford to have more different types,
but with the increasing threat, the complexity of
weapons systems, of weapons, antiship cruise mis-
sies and the like, the cost of aircraft to meet
the threat has gone up astronomically. We can no
longer afford diverse and different types.
[Ref. 59: p. 959 ]
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One of the concerns was that the first substantial increase
of AV-8B procurement was in 1983, which was also a big year
for F/A-18 procurement [ Ref . 60: p. 16]. Funding for the
AV-8B complicated Navy planning for aircraft procurement.
There were several options for how the A7-8B would be funded
if the program were approved [Ref. 61: p. 75]. The Navy was
hoping that the money would come from outside the Navy budg-
et altogether. Another option was that the money would come
from Navy programs other than aviation and not complicate
the aviation procurement picture further. If the money had
to come from within the aviation programs there were several
options:
1. Transfer three F-4 squadrons from the Marines to the
Navy. A corresponding adjustment would allow the Navy
to recieve the first F/A-18's.
2. Cutback or stretchout the F/A-18 procurement.
3. Reduce procurement of the CH-53 helicopter for the
Marines.
The analysis of the costs involved in the F/A-18 and AV-8B
programs had shown that the life cycle costs of the A-18 and
the AV-8B options for the Marine Corps were about equal, but
there was a problem with funding because more money was
needed earlier in the AV-8B program. As one Navy official
put it, "We do support the Marine* s requirement, and with
the life-cycle costs, the AV-8B will pay for itself, but
it's the front-end investment that's choking us." [Ref. 62:
p. 56]
Again in 1980 severe fiscal constraints started the Navy
thinking about cancelling the F/A-18 program. Navy
Secretary Edward Hildago said: "Escalating costs of the
F/A-18 have raised serious questions in my mind including
the disturbing possibility of canceling the F/A-18."
[Ref. 63, p. 22] As the possibility of canceling the F/A-18
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program was being weighed, even the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) was analyzing options for aircraft to replace
the F/A-18. The replacements studied by OMB were:
1. The F-14. 725 aircraft at a cost of $22.1 billion.
2. The AV-8B. 322 aircraft at a cost of $6.1 billion, in-
cluding research and development costs.
3. The A-7. 36 of the "B" model A-7»s then in production
for $400 million and another $5.9 billion for 453
twin-engined versions including research and develop-
ment costs.
The total cost of the 1536 aircraft in the above option was
estimated at $34.5 billion, which had to be weighed against
the current estimate for the F/A-18 at that time of $31.5
billion for 1300 aircraft. [Ref. 64: p. 18]
With their concerns about Naval aviation overall, con-
cerns about what aircraft the Navy could get for its own
use, and concerns about tha future of Navy V/STOL, Navy of-
ficials also went to Capital Hill to testify before
Congress.
Some of the testimony was in strong support of the AV-8B
program, and some was not so strong. An example of the lat-
ter was given by Vice Admiral F.C. Turner, the Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) in 1979:
Senator Cannon. Are you saying, then, when you
say you support it, support the AV-8B. but it
sounds to me like you don* t support it very strong
because you can see that it has got to come out of
your hide someplace, is that it?
Admiral Turner. That is essentially it...
Senator Levin. Based on the af f ordability gues-
Hon, would It be fair to say that you concur in
that decision of the Department of Defense? [To
cancel the AV-8B]
Admiral Turner. As a representative for the
PfeSicTenrrs Budget and the decisions which have
been reflected in the Department. I would have to
say "Yes." [Ref. 59: ppf 987-988]
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Admiral Hayward, the CNO f testified about the AV-8B on sev-
eral occasions and he tried to support the Marine Corps
while at the same time still not showing much enthusiasm for
the AV-8B as a future aircraft for the Navy:
The Navy has continuously supported the Marine
Corps requirement for the AV-8B and recognizes the
high priority the Commandant places on the pro-
gram-.. From what I have seen to date, the v/STOL
concept offers great potential for enhancing the
Navy 1 s future sea based air capabilities. I would
like to withhold my final judgement on both near
term decisions and the future role of V/STOL until
I have completed my assessment of all the factors
that impact on the scope and direction of future
sea based air programs. As I have stated in the
?ast, I fully support the AV-8B for the Marine
orps. [Ref. 65: p. 8 46]
The Navy will continue to support development of
the AV-8B as being a sound investment to sustain
the momentum of V/STOL technology irrespective of
a decision for AV-8B procurement. [Ref. 66: p.
662]
Senat or Nunn. Do you. think that the F-18 is a vi-
aTJT5"STIbsTiTute rot the Advanced HARRIER, given
the peculiar requirements of Marine aviation?
Admiral Hayward, Yes. either aircraft can fulfill
the Marine requirement, for a light attack air-
craft. [Ref. 67: p. 549]
Sen ator Hart. When will the first American- built
775T0IT~ai?craft achieve IOC, in current plans if
the AV-8B is cancelled?
Admiral Haywar d. While I supported the AV-8B for
TEe Harine iignt attack role, funds permitting, I
did not consider the technology embodied in this
aircraft a forward step in our long range effort
to develop a seabased v/STOL fully capable of na-
val roles and functions. [Ref. 67: p. 567]
In spite of a Department of Defense view that opposed
both the Navy and the Marine Corps, opponents of the AV-8B
program were overridden and the program was continued by
Congress and still continues today.
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Y. THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VIEW
A. WHEN THE CONTROVERSY BEGAN
Each year the Secretary of Defense makes a statement to
Congress on the status of his department, the budget for the
coming year, and the current Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
.
From 1970 until 1977, all the Secretarys of Defense support-
ed the acquisition of the Harrier by the Marine Corps [Ref.
68: p* 60; 69: pp. 93, 183; 70: p. 83; 71:p. 69; and 72: pp.
145, 148-149]. In his statements of 1976 and 1977,
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated the
Department of Defense plans for the Advanced Harrier:
The Marine light attack force will consist of five
squadrons of A-4M»s and three squadrons of AV-8A*s
through fiscal year 19 81. Starting in fiscal year
1982, the Marines plan to replace all of their
light attack aircraft with the AV-8B. [Ref. 73:
p. 150]
and
The AV-8B development program aims at building
upon the AV-8A program to produce a vectored
thrust attack aircraft superior to the A-4M and
superior to the AV-8A in STOL and V/STOL perform-
ance. [Ref. 73: p. 15 3]
and
...plans for upgrading and modernizing Marine
tactical aviation include the introduction of the
F-18 for the fighter/attack mission and the AV-8B
for the close air support mission. [Ref. 7U: p.
221 ]
Support for the AV-8B stopped when Harold Brown became
the Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter.
Secretary Brown did not seem completely opposed to the
Advanced Harrier program when he first took office. In his
first statement to the Congress in 1978 he stated:
Pl.ans for upgrading an <J modernizing Marine avia-tion include introduction of the F-18 tor nhe
fighter/attack mission and additional procurment
of the A-4M. There is also a possibility that we




Mr. Brown expressed a wait-and-see attitude about the AV-8B,
he said:
The PY79 program includes development of two pro-
totype YAV-8B aircraft and additional R&D funds
for further AV-8B subsystem development.
Procurement is deferred pending a determination
that the YAV-8B 1 s meet performance goals and a
Defense Department assessment that the AV-8B of-
fers significant advantages over conventional air-
craft such as the F/A-18. [Ref. 75: p. 221]
However, by the next year, Secretary Brown had completely
made up his mind about the AV-8B. In his statement to the
Congress on the FY1980 Defense Budget, he said:
Modernization of the Navy and Marine Corps tacti-
cal air forces will be accelerated during the five
year period by the introduction of the moderately
priced F/A-18 aircraft. The F/A-18 program will
reduce the number and types of aircraft in carrier
and Marine aircraft wj.ngs by using a common system
for the fighter and light attack missions, result-
ing in reduced operating and support costs... In
light of expected limitations on funding for pro-
curement of Marine and Navy aircraft in the
1980's f and the need to purchase larger numbers of
such aircraft, we have decided to terminate fund-
ing for AV-8B research and development. While this
aircraft does appear to have some potential for
Marine Corps close air support missions, it ap-
pears that its measurable advantages over a con-
ventional aircraft, such as the dual-mission
F/A-18*s, may be minimal. In any event, there are
advantages in concentrating on fewer types of
aircraft. [Ref. 76: pp. 188-189]
The fiscal year 1980 funding for the AV-8B, requested by the
Marines and deleted by the Department of Defense, was re-
stored by Congress. In spite of this support of the AV-8B
shown by Congress, Mr. Brown remained in opposition to the
program, and he expressed his opposition again in his 1980
statement to Congress:
Although the V/STQL performance of the AV-8B gives
it unique capabilities, it is not as capable as
the F/A-18 in most close air support missions and
is markedly inferior in air-to-air and interdic-
tion missions. Because we wish to maintain Navy
and Marine Corps force levels and performance at a
reasonable cost, we have decided that proceeding
with the AV-8B program is not justified at this
budget level and have not included funding for it
in the FY81 budget. However, we will continue to
work with the United Kingdom to determine whether
there exists the potential for a common U.S. -O.K.
venture which would procure enough AV-8B*s to
change our view about continuing the program.
[Ref. 77: p. 200 ]
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The Marine Corps wanted the AV-8B very badly. The Navy
supported the Marine's Advanced Harrier program. The 8-18
study had concluded that, compared to the A-18, the AV-8B
was the best aircraft for the close air support mission, and
would cost no more than the A-18. With all of this going for
the Advanced Harrier program, why was the Secretary of
Defense so set against it?
B. THE OSD CASE AGAINST THE AV-8B
In 1977 Defense Secretary Harold Brown had made a deci-
sion to delay the procurement of AV-8B*s and buy more A-UM's
instead. A "reclama" to this decision was made by the
Marines which prompted Mr. Brown to order the comparative
analysis of the AV-8B and the A-18. A meeting was held in
November 1977 between Secretary Brown, Secretary of the Navy
w. Graham Claytor, Jr., and Commandant of the Marine Corps
General Louis H. Wilson. The 8-18 study was discussed at
length during that meeting, and one defense offical said, "I
gather things did not go well for the Marines." [Ref. 78:
p. 30] Desipte the fact that the Navy/Marine Corps study
showed that the AV-8B was more effective and no more costly
than the A-18, Mr. Brown was still not convinced that the
AV-8B should be approved. Not satisfied with the results of
the 8-18 study. Secretary Brown directed his Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PASE), Russell Murray II, to conduct another study on the
two aircraft [Ref. 79: p. 4 7].
The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for PA&E
is an influential position. The duties of the PA&E office
were outlined by Mr. Murray when he testified before
Congress at his own nomination hearing:
As the. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program
Analysis and Evaluation, my mam role would be to
advise the Secretary of Defense on issues involv-
ing force structure, choices between alternative
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weapon systems, scenarios on which our planning
should be based, the capabilities of alternative
forces and what they cost, and similar matters of
central importance in defense planning.
Some parts of such issues can be resolved, or
at least illuminated, through quantitative analy-
sis. The rest transcend the limits of analysis,
and thus must be resolved through judgement. 1
would confine the work of this office to the for-
mer: analysis. Judgements, to the extent that
they are made within the Department of Defense,
are the responsibility of the Secretary of
Defense, not this office.
Analysis can be a powerful tool, and thus this
analytically based office will no doubt be influ-
ential. J recognize that with that influence comes
a concomitant responsibility to assure that the
analyses meet the highest standards of integrity
and professional competance. I intend to see that
they do, that they are done in an open and explic-
it way, that they are documented ana reproducible,
and that they are made available to the Services
for their inspection and rebuttal. I feel that
such prodedures, long considered routine in scien-
tific research, are the best way of assuring a
quality of analysis equal to the importance of the
decisions it will influence. [Ref. 80: pp. 11-12]
After they analyzed the 8-18 Study, Mr. Murray and his staff
took issue with almost every point made in the study. The
PASE staff were as firm in their choice of the F/A-18 as the
Marines were in their choice of the A7-8B. The OSD analysts
liked the larger, twin-engined, supersonic F/A-18 tetter be-
cause of its dual nature, it can be both a light attack
bomber and an all-weather fighter. Mr. Murray said in 1981
that the 8-18 Study served as the principal source for the
quantitative side of the AV-8B controversy, and that
"...little more of any fundamental significance has surfaced
in the intervening three years." [Ref. 81: p. 50] The PA&E
analysis of the 8-18 Study concluded that the original
Navy/Marine Corps analysis was not done correctly. Points
of the study disputed by PASE fell into three main
categories [Ref 81: pp. 52-53]:
1 . Cost s
:
PASE maintained that the 8-18 analysis charged the
A- 18 option with the costs of seventy-two A-4 Skyhawks
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to be bought to fill a short term shortage, but that
the shortage was left unfilled in the AV-8B alterna-
tive. PASE said that the AV-8B's could not be built
fast enough to fill the shortage, so they deleted the
A-4 costs from the A- 18 option. PASE applied discount-
ing to the costs of the two options. The AV-8B option
had more research and development costs yet to come in
its program, while the A- 18 program had already com-
pleted its R&D phase. Because the R&D costs still as-
sociated with the AV-8B program caused it to be
"front- loaded," the application of discounting lowered
the cost of the A- 18 relative to the AV-8B. The combi-
nation of the A -4 adjustment and the application of
discounting altered the relative costs of the two air-
craft so that under the PA&E analysis the cost ratio
was 4 P/A-IS's for the price of 3 AV-8B*s.
Close A ir Support :
a) PA&E maintained that there is no generally accepted
estimate of how quickness relates to goodness in
the responsiveness of close air support. They main-
tained that the values for responsiveness used by
the Marines in the study, which were based on com-
bat experience, may not have been valid because
it*s difficult for an analyst to distinguish be-
tween (a) valid and accurately percieved combat ex-
perience, (b) what the combat veteran honestly, but
mistakenly thought was going on in the heat of bat-
tle, and (c) what merely masquerades under the au-
thoritative guise of combat experience. The PA&E
answer to this problem was to conduct a "sensitivi-
ty analysis" on the responsiveness portion of the
8-18's effectiveness analysis. PA&E found that when
they arbitrarily doubled the the times allowed for
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the aircraft to get to the targets, there was no
advantage for the AV-8B. That was not surprising
because getting to the target quickly is what the
AV-8B does best. PASE also found that cutting the
time allowed for the aircraft to get to the target
had the same result of eliminating any advantage
for the AV-8B. They deduced from this that the par-
ticular parameters used in the study were chosen by
the Marines to maximize the advantage of the AV-8B
over the A-18.
b) PA&E also took exception to the way that the A-18»s
were forced to operate in the study scenarios. In
the study the A-18 *s were called from ground alert
at a base that was 100-150 miles to the rear of the
FEBA, instead, the A-18»s should have been placed
in combat air patrol (CAP) stations in the vicinity
of the battle ("air loiter") . The CAPping of the
A-18»s improved their score significantly, by about
25% for a base 100 miles away and about UO* for a
base 150 miles away. PA&E also thought that it was
unrealistic to make the A-18*s retire to a CAP sta-
tion 20 miles away from the target area before re-
turning to make a second pass at any target.
c) PASE also took exception to the study's assumption
that the A-18»s would be based 100-150 miles from
the FEBA, and determined that the average distance
from any random sp ct to a base with a runway long
enough for the A-18 was lass than 50 miles in
Europe, the Middle East, or in Korea.
3 . Airbase V ulnerabilit y
:
PASE argued against the AV-SB^ basing flexibility ad-
vantage over the A-18 on two counts. First, the 8-18
Study did not account for any difference in the likely
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losses of enemy aircraft in attacking the bases in the
study. For the AV-8B the enemy would only have to pen-
etrate less than 20 miles of defenses for some forward
sites and perhaps 50 miles for main bases, but for the
A- 18 bases the enemy would have to penetrate 100-150
miles. Second, if the runways of our airbases could
be cut, then the rest of the Marine fixed wing air-
craft: the fighters, the medium attack, the tankers,
and the electronic countermeasure aircraft would be
grounded. If the enemy has enough air power to cut our
runways, and we can't get any fighters into the air,
then the enemy has air superiority. Because of this,
PA8E maintained that in a situation of enemy air su-
periority, even if they could get into the air, the
AV-8B's would not survive long enough to make any dif-
ference.
C. THE MARINE CORPS' ANSWER TO OSD CRITICISM
The Marine Corps, of course, did not agree with the PA&E
analysis of the 8-18 Study. LtGen Miller expressed how the
Marines looked upon the developing controversy when the re-
sults of the study and the V/STOL concept developed by the
Marine Corps was challenged:
We have a lot of experts around town who haven 1 1
seen a shot fired in anger in war who seem to
think they know more about what we need to fight a
war with than those of us who have spent thirty-
five to forty years fighting it. That's the part
that's a little frustrating. The Marine Corps has
always been value-conscious of the assets provided
it, but we also never cease attempting to improve
our capability to do our job better and more effi-
ciently. Therefore, cutting out the AV-8B from
the 1980 Defense Budget will just delay it for as
many years as those people who apparently believe
thay have greater wisdom than we, prevent us from
continuing to obtain the best weapons systems
possible. [Ref. 34: p. 53]
The Marine Corps in turn answered with its own critique of
the OSD analysis of the 8-1 8 Study.
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1 . Cost s
:
The Marine Corps cited several cost analyses done
since the 1977 8-18 Study that showed [Ref. 11: p.
59]:
a) If AV-8B procurement were added to the programmed
F/A-18 procurement, more rather than less aircraft
could be acquired for the same overall cost. To do
this there would have to be a trade-off of expen-
sive outyear (inflated) F/A-18 procurement for
greater near year costs.
b) If the life cycle costs are considered, as they
were in the 8-18 study, then approximately three
percent more aircraft could be procured in the
AV-8B mix.
2- Close Air Support : [ Ref. 11: p. 60]
a) To the charge that it had chosen the responsiveness
parameters in the 8-18 Study to maximize the advan-
tages of the AV-8B , the Marine Corps answered that
to the contrary, the AV-8B employment concept had
been developed to meet the required responsiveness.
The target urgency and value decay times used in
the 3-18 study were supported by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff [Ref. 58: p. 43]. They also claimed that
the times used by PASE in their "sensitivity analy-
sis" (half of the stipulated times in the study)
were times that could not be practically attained
by any aircraft.
b) The PA&E analysis also assumes perfect mission con-
vertability between fighter and attack for the
F/A-18. The A-18 only realizes its full benefit in
the post-attack retirement. The Air Force learned
in Vietnam that mission convertability does not
work. [Ref. 58: p. 43]
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c) The Marine Corps agreed that "air loiter" for the
A- 18 would maximize responsiveness, but the Combat
Air Patrol technique of handling on-call close air
support missions had been proven in the past to be
inefficient and un supportable over the long term.
It is efficient only for short periods of intense
combat, whereas the forward basing concept of the
Harrier is efficient in all cases and maximizes
sortie rate while minimizing fuel usage.
d) To the requirement of making the A-18 retire 20
miles (a distance that equates to 2.5 minutes fly-
ing time) before making a second pass at the tar-
get, the Marines answered that in the 8-18 Study
that requirement was imposed on the AV-8B as well
and is a necessary tactic for survival on a modern
battlefield saturated with surface to air weapons
along the FEBA.
e) The Marine Corps assumption of the conventional
airbase being a distance of 10 0-150 miles behind
the FEBA is again based on combat experience and
official scenarios which show that conventional
aircraft will be based up to as much as 200 miles
from the battle area.
D. OSD SPLITS ON THE AV-8B
Aft€r seeing the analysis from his own PA5E office,
Secretary Brown's mind was firmly made up against the AV-8B.
Even after the Congress had restored the funds he had taken
out of the budget in 1979, Mr. Brown remained adamant about
the Marine Corps not getting the AV-8B. During the budget
process for FY1980, the Navy included the AV-8B in the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) with its other top prior-
ity items that would make up the budget at a minimum funding
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level. However, OSD directed that the program be moved from
the minimum to the basic level during the program review.
This means it was given a lower priority. That movement was
objected to by the Navy in a "reclama," but OSD stood by
their action. Next, the Navy moved the AV-8B program to what
was called Band One, the highest priority level the program
could be given outside the minimum budget. During the later
stages of the budget process OSD moved the program again,
this time to Band Three. The decision on where to place the
Av-8B program was made at the highest levels within the OSD.
[Ref. 46: p. 576] In 1979 Secretary Brown testified to
Congress:
?y cancellation of the AV-8B program shows how Ieel about that program. The AV-8B is basically an
updated AV-8A designed to correct many of the de-
ficiencies seen in the earlier aircraft. The
AV-8B does not represent an advance in the state-
of-the-art in V/STOL technology, nor does it pro-
vide the capability that the Navy desires for
sea-based operations. [Ref. 61: p. 76]
For the second year in a row, Congress restored the AV-8B
funding to the budget.
The following year, the very same actions were taken by
the Marine Corps, the Navy, OSD, and Congress. The AV-8B
was included in the basic level of the Department of the
Navy budget when the budget was initially put together.
When the AV-8B was moved to a lower priority by OSD, the
Marine Corps recommended that it be put back. The Marines
recommended that the A-18»s budgeted for the Marine light
attack force be taken out as an offset for restoring the
AV-SB^ to the highest priority. OSD did not do this. After
the budget process was complete, the AV-8B program again did
not appear in the budget at all. [Ref. 48: p. 854] While
testifying on the PY1981 budget in 1980, Mr. Brown again let
Congress know exactly where he stood on the AV-8B program:
Mr. Edward s. How are you and the AV-8B doing?
Secretary Brow n. Well, as you know, it is not in
tne Du'dget, an<I the reasons are the same as they
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were last year- They include high cost and
relatively small numbers for a special capability




What I am afraid of Mr. Edwards, is that the
Congress will year by year force us to do the R&D
and then when it sees the procurement cost per
item, will change its mind and agree that the pro-
curement is not in order and say why did you waste
all this money. [Ref. 82: pp. 523-524]
While Secretary of Defense Brown and his Assistant
Secretary for PA5E were thoroughly against the AV-8B, there
were other important officials in the Department of Defense
that were in favor of the AV-8B. At the time of DSARC I for
the AV-8B, in early 1976, the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) stated that the Marine Corps requirement
for an all V/STOL light attack force should remain an open
issue until DSARC II, about the middle of 1979. A key point
stressed by DDRSE was the operational utility of the Harrier
in the NATO environment due to its basing flexibility
[Ref. 42: p. 20]. An earlier director had been opposed to
the Marines original acquisition of Harriers from Britain,
but after observing the Marines basing concept for V/STOL
during Exercise VERSATILE WARRIOR he was completely won over
and fully endorsed the Harrier for the Marine Corps
[Ref. 17: p. 52],
In early 1980, the Defense Science Board came out
strongly in favor of the AV-8B after a study done by its
Task Force on V/STOL Aircraft [Ref. 6 2: p. 56]. One member
of that task force made the following statement concerning
the importance of V/STOL:
...history provided ample evidence of the folly
of mortgaging the future to pay for the present.
If steps are not taken now to insure the continu-
ity and expansion of V/STOL operational experi-
ence, there is little chance that V/STOL, STOVL or
any other alphabetic arrangement signifying the
use of power to augment conventional takeoff and
landing characteristics will be available when
required. [Ref. 12: p. 30]
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The Defense Science Boards task force was definitely in fa-
vor of V/STOL. They recommended that the AV-8B proceed
through complete evaluation of STOL and STOVL operations.
It was clear that the AV-8B was the only aircraft around
that was going to be able to give the U.S. any operational
experience in order to move V/STOL into the future. The
Board also praised the AV-8 B as a worthwhile replacement for
the "very limited" British AV-8 A. [Ref. 62: p. 56]
Other officials within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense who were in favor of the AV-8B were: Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy Robert Komer, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development Dr.
William Perry, and Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham
Claytor, Jr. [Ref. 83: pp. 41-42]. Mr. Claytor had become
an advocate of V/STOL and the AV-8B while he was the
Secretary of the Navy [Ref. 42: p. 19].
E. OSD VERSUS CONGRESS
Secretary of Defense Brown tried to fight Congress on
their continuation of the AV-8B program. After Congress re-
stored the fiscal year 1979 funds for the Advanced Harrier
program that Brown had cut from the Presidents budget, the
Department of Defense tried to hold back those funds.
Congress had approved $123 million in fiscal year 1979 funds
for research, development, testing, and evaluation of the
two YAV-8B«s. [Ref. 41: p. 49] In January 1979 the
Department of Defense deferred about $108 million of those
funds, letting the Marine Corps spend the remaining $15 mil-
lion for the YAV-8B Prototype program [Ref. 47: p. 545].
Some members of Congress, especially the supporters of the
AV-8B program, were upset about what DOD was doing with mon-
ey that they had appropriated for an authorized program.
While the committees were conducting their hearings on the
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fiscal year 1980 budget, they questioned their witnesses
about DOD«s holding back of the 1979 AV-8B funds-
Secretary Brown himself was asked about this matter by
the Senate Subcommitte on Defense Appropriations:
Sen ator Young. Is it true that FY 1979 funds which
Co"5gTe"5s""Ia"*naated in last year's budget for the
AV-8B have been deferred?
Secretary Brown. The Presidents budget for FY80
includes no funds for the continuation of the
AV-8B program in FY80. Under Secretary Perry au-
thorized the Navy to complete the FY79 Advanced
Development program with no funding or progammatic
changes. He also authorized the Navy to spend up
to $15M of their FY197 9 Engineering Development
funds to sustain current personnel levels and con-
duct limited development activities both in the OS
and OK. We do not intend to put the AV-8B into
Full Scale Development. Present plans should per-
mit reasonable exploitation of the flight test
aircraft prior to program termination.
Senat or Young. Is the combination of deferral of
the "FY79~funas and the FY1980 budget intended to
kill the AV-8B? If so, why was this action taken
without notifying Congress of the deferral of
funds in accordance with the Anti-Impoundment
Control Act?
Secretary Brown. We have decided to terminate the
"AT^Bb progra"mT~f or reasons we previously stated.
At the present time the program is continuing but
will be closed out later this year. As we will be
spending about $60M of the Advanced and
Engineering funds appropriated for FY79, we be-
lieve that no additional notification is necessary
at this time. [ Ref . 84: p. 465]
General Wilson was questioned:
Senator Stennis. The $108 million Referral, as I
understand", w*o"TIld cause a slippage in the program.
You are referring to money that has already been
appropriated for fiscal 1979. Is that correct?
General Wilson. Yes. sir, of the $123 million
that was appropriated and authorized in 1979, $108
million has been deferred.
Senator Sten nis. I call that to the attention of
the suficommi1HEe"e . This subcommittee's duty is to
try and help set priorities.
What was the sum of money for the AV-8B that
got left out of the fiscal 1980 budget request
sent to Congress?
General Wilson. That was $203 million in fiscal
year T?80~:
Senator Stenni s. $203 million?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
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Senator Stennis. Of course, nothing has happened
since then~^o lessen the need for this program?
General Wilson- That is true- I might say that,
if"^5e~Co"n"gTe"3s should see fit to appropriate mon-
ey for fiscal year 198 0, the deferral of fiscal
year 1979 funding is costing us roughly $7.5 mil-
lion for each month of delay.
Senator Stennis. We appreciate that information.
Tf^wiTI "Be ouifduty to pass on the program one way
or the other.
Sen ator Young. First, General Wilson- what. reason
"w^~gTVeirxoT the deferral of the $108 million?
General Wilson. The reason was given that the R&D
Tu"n"as~wer"e
-
a*eTeted from the 1980 budget.
Therefore, this would presumably be a wind-down of
the AV-8B program. Accordingly, it was presumed
that since it was not requested by the president,
the money would not be approved by the Congress.
Now, there are two YAV-8B's that haye been
built. One is now flying at Patuxent River, and
one is flying at the McDonnell Douglas factory in
St. Louis.
Senator Bumper s. How many of those are there?
General Wilson . Two, sir.
Senator Young. In other words, the program is be-
ing ?e?mITiaT£d
?
General Wilson. For all practical purposes, yes.
TT5~iniio-E-wTll be the wind-down. r * 2
Secretary. Clavto r. $15 million, keeping the pres-
en^~^esl: going and that is all.
General Wilson. Yes.
Senat or Young. Will that seriously hurt the
nannes"?
General Wilson. I believe it will, sir.
pref7-*5T"~p*p7- 93 9-940 ]
General Wilson had raised the point that if the program were
to be continued over the objections of OSD, then the defer-
ral of the development funds in early 1979 was adding a
great deal of cost to the program. This point was emphasized
by other Navy Department officials during testimony in other
hearings before Congress [Ref. 47: pp. 1043-1045 and 85: pp.
386-387].
Senator Hart. General tiddler, what is the status
oT~rf5S~f isc'a'i year 197 9 funds which Congress au-
thorized and appropriated for AV-8B engineering
development? Is there any impact on schedule?
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General Miller. Of the $123 million funds
a'uTlio'rizeffToT the AV- 8B Program in fiscal year
1979, $108 million have been "deferred" or not re-
leased. The continued inability to commit these
funds could incur a delay in Initial Operational
Capability (IOC)* and will certainly increase
downstream costs. [Ref. 47: p. 1050]
As a result of the deferral, congressional advocates of
the AV-8B of the AV-8B put pressure on Secretary Brown to
release the $108 million to the Marine Corps. Because
Congress percieved the holding back of the AV-8B funds as
unauthorized deferral of Congressionally authorized funding,
the pro-AV-8B sentiment built up in a backlash against OSD.
It was expected that Senator Gary Hart was going to take
some action to force the spending of the $108 million, but
before he had to take any action, the Defense Department
agreed to release the money. House and Senate aides pre-
dicted that legislators would continue to "express their
will" in favor of the A7-8B over the objections of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 60: p. 16]
The delays that the OSD made in the AV-8B program caused
a substantial cost growth in the program. At the beginning
of 1980, the cost growth in the program was estimated at
nearly $1 billion. Most of that cost growth was attributable
to the OSD delays. In a report to Congress, the Comptroller
General of the Onited States stated:
Two Department of Defsnse funding actions resulted
in delaying the AV-8B procurement program. The
combined effect of these actions postponed the
AV-8B's initial operational capability by 2 years
and was the principal cause of the program's cost
growth. The AV-8B's initial operational capability ?
is now planned to occur in 1986. Each year that
the initial operational capability milestone was
delayed, total aguisition costs increased an
average of $461 million. [Ref. 86: pp. 5-6]
The two delays referred to in the Comptroller General's re-
port were the witholding of the $108 million in PY1979 funds
and the absence of any reguest for AV-8B funds in the FY1980
* The IOC occurs on the date that the 30th aircraft isdelivered to the Marine Corps [Ref. 86: p. 6].
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budget, which caused a new five year profile to be drawn up
after Congress reinstated AV-8B funding for that year also
[Ref. 86: p. 6].
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Throughout the 1910*5, the U.S. Marine Corps conducted a
Vertical and Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft
experiment with the AV-8A Harrier. The Harrier, an airplane
of British manufacture, was originally developed to satisfy
a requirement laid down by Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF)
for a small, lightweight reconnaissance/fighter/attack air-
craft that could operate independent of the easily targeta-
ble runways of Europe, and operate from dispersed sites
close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) . To
fill that RAF requirement, the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft
Company, which later became part of British Aerospace, de-
veloped and produced the Harrier. The Harrier, designated
the AV-8A by the United States, is a single seat, single en-
gined, V/STOL airplane. The Harrier operates on the vec-
tored thrust principle, utilizing four rotatable exhaust
pipes, cr nozzles, which are placed in pairs on either side
of the airplane. The four nozzles are placed symetrically
about the plane* s center of gravity. The nozzles are rotated
down for vertical flight and to the rear for forward flight.
After the RAF ordered their first Harriers in 1967, the U.S.
Marine Corps began to look seriously at the Harrier to fill
their long-standing requirement for a fixed-wing V/STOL jet
aircraft that could operate from helicopter-sized platforms
on ships, as well as from small clearings near the FEBA.
With the Harrier, the Marines could increase the responsive-
ness of the direct air support received by ground combat
units. The Harrier would also enable the Marines to estab-
lish their light attack force in operations ashore much
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sooner than conventional airplanes during an amphibious as-
sault. The first of three combat light attack squadrons to
be equipped with AV-8A's became operational in 1971.
Very soon after beginning to operate their Harrier
squadrons, the Marine Corps established a requirement for a
follow-on V/STOL to become operational in the 1980*s. This
descendent of the AV-8A was to be improved enough in range
and payload to replace a ll the airplanes in the Marine light
attack force, both AV-8A's and A-4 Skyhawks. This second
generation Harrier, the AV-8B, was to be built by McDonnell
Douglas, an American company, in cooperation with British
Aerospace, Rolls Royce of England, and another American com-
pany, Pratt 5 Whitney. In their AV-8B design, McDonnell
Douglas used the same engine as the AV-8A and made use of
lightweight graphite epoxy composite materials in the place
of much of the metal structure, an aerodynamically improved
wing, lift improvement devices, and state-of-the-art elec-
tronics to give the AV-8B twice the performance of the
AV-8A. With an all AV-8B light attack force, the Marines
would be one step closer to their long range goal of con-
verting their air wings entirely to V/STOL aircraft.
However, getting the AV-8B was not easy.
When Harold Brown became Secretary of Defense under
President Jimmy Carter, he tried to discontinue the AV-8B
program, which had been supported by previous Secretaries of
Defense. Secretary Brown was convinced by Russell Murray II,
his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis &
Evaluation (PA&E) , that the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet
fighter/attack aircraft was less expensive and superior to
the Advanced Harrier. The Marine Corps did want the F-18 as
a fighter to replace their worn out F-4 Phantom fighters,
but they did not want to give up the V/STOL capability of
the AV-8B in their light attack force for the A- 18 attack
version of the Hornet.
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A Navy-Marine analysis showed that the AV-8B was not
only more effective in the close air support role than the
A-18, but that a mixed F-18 and AV-8B force was no more
costly over the life of the aircraft than the all F/A-18
force favored by Secretary Brown and Mr. Murray. After the
Navy-Marine analysis was published Mr. Murray convinced Dr.
Brown that the study was not valid and that a common F/A-18
aircraft for the Navy and the Marines was the best choice.
During the FY79 budget debate, Acting Secretary of the Navy
R. James Woolsey summarized the Navy-Marine view of the
AV-8B for the Secretary of Defense:
In summary, we think we have a fine airplane
that will pave the way for many potential revolu-
tions in aviation. Those who asserted so confi-
dently that the range and payload limitations of
the Av-8 were immutable have now grown a bit
?uieter on this issue, given the performance of
he AV-8B»s supercritical wing ana the continuing
and exciting British work with the ski jump.
CINCEOR has recognized the airfield vulnerability
?roblem for which V/STOL is a recognized solution,
his problem is certain to grow worse in years to
come with the advent of cruise missies ana cluster
munitions, especially in short conflict situations
j[or in the opening phases of a long one). We are
in our infancy in assessing the payoff of V/STOL
for naval forces. The Marines know of the AV-8*s
benefits in close support, particularly in the
early stages of hostilities. It is a landmarkjoint weapon development program with the UK.
holding much promise for our NATO interoperability
objectives.
In the 1940s we had some difficult years devel-
oping helicopters. A lor of people weren't sure
exactly what missions they would be used for. No
one then could have done, or did, a detailed cost
effectiveness analysis of their utility for such
missions as firing wire-guided missiles against
tanks, interrogating sonobuoys with sophisticated
signal processing gear, or lifting sixteen tons.
Yet we now routinely use helicopters for these ma-
jor tasks. Happily, we did not think ourselves
smart enough then to stop work on a new way to fly
because we could not see the future clearly. I
don't know all of the advantages that the AV-8B
will bring to 0. S- aviation. Nor does anyone. But
I don't think we can afford to terminate our only
V/STOL aircraft today... [ Ref . 87, pp. 7-8]
Each year that he was the Secretary of Defense, Dr.
Brown, on the recommendation cf his assistant, Russell
Murray, cut from the defense budget the AV-8B funding
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requested by the Marine Corps. Each year that happened, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commandant of the Marine Zorps, and the Deputy Chief of
Staff Marine Corps for Aviation, as well as some other
officials, testified before the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees that the Marina V/STOL concept was valid and
operationally proven and that the Marine Corps needed the
AV-8B. Secretary Brown testified before the very same
committees that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
analysis showed the AV-8B to be inferior to and more
expensive than the F/A-18. Each year the Congress restored
the research & development and procurement funds necessary
for the Marines to begin to operate AV-8B f s in 1985*
After Ronald Reagan became president, and Harold Brown
was no longer the Secretary of Defense, the Marines consid-
ered the battle of the AV-8B won at last, that they had
overcome DOD opposition and the sometimes less than all-out
support of the U.S. Navy. The Reagan administration re-
quested funds in the FY82 budget for the first production
models of the AV-8B [ Ref . 8 8: p. 15]. Lieutenant General
William J, White, the present Marine Corps Deputy Chief of
Staff for Aviation said:
After a long and difficult struggle, the AV-8B is
finally an established program... With the pres-
ent rate of progress. I see no real difficulty in
meeting the goal of having AV-8B*s operational in
1985 and then moving ahead to complete the tran-
sition of all eight light attack squadrons by
1989. [Ref. 32: p. 42]
B. CONCLUSIONS
In 1969 Graham T. Allison, a professor of politics at
Harvard, published an article in which he proposed:
1. Most analysts of choices and actions of national gov-
ernments explain the behavior of those governments in
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terms of a basic conceptual model called the Rational
Policy Model.
2. There are two alternative conceptual models that could
provide a base for improved explanation. These other
two models are called the Organizational Process Model
and the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
Allison explains his models principally in terms of happen-
ings in foreign policy decision making, his approach was de-
veloped from a study of the Cuban Missle Crisis, but the
models can be generalized for government decisions about the
military, including weapons procurement decisions.
[Ref. 89: pp. 689-718 ]
The Rational Policy Model as explained by Allison says
that Government actions maximize strategic goals and objec-
tives. The government is seen as a rational, unitary deci-
sion maker. This single actor (the government) has one set
of specified goals, one set of perceived options, and a sin-
gle estimate of the consequences that follow from each al-
ternative. In this model, the action selected by the
government is the alternative that is value maximizing, i.e.
the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of
its goals and objectives. An analyst using this model would
infer from a particular action that the government taking
the action must have had ends toward which the action con-
stituted an optimal means. The central idea of value-maxim-
izing implies the following:
1. An increase in the cost of an alternative, or a reduc-
tion in the value of the set of consequences, or a re-
duction in the probability of attaining a fixed set of
consequences, r educe s the liklihood of that alterna-
tive being chosen.
2. A decrease in the cost of an alternative, or an in-
crease in the value of the set of consequences, or an
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increase in the probability of attaining a fixed set
of consequences, incr ease s the liklihood of that al-
ternative being chosen.
Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model says that many ac-
tors who are positioned hierarchically within the govern-
ment, and who individually focus on diverse issues, decide
what actions the government will take based on bargining
along regularized channels, such as PPBS and the budget pro-
cess. The power in government is shared by these somewhat
independent political leaders who have ascended to the top
of the bureaucratic apparatus. Because men share power and
they differ on what must be done, policy is resolved by pol-
itics. Often, the pulling on a decision in different direc-
tions by different groups results in an action that is
distinct from what anyone intended. In this model the gov-
ernment action is not a chosen solution to a problem, but an
outcome resulting from compromise, coalition, competition,
and confusion among government officials who see differnt
faces of an issue. The model is political in the sense that
the final action is a result of bargaining.
How was the government 1 s action on the decision to buy
the AV-8B determined? Was the final outcome the result of
choosing among alternatives that had the highest valued con-
sequences, the most probability of success, or the least
cost? Or, was the outcome the result of compromise, coali-
tion, and competition? The case study assembled in the pre-
ceeding four chapters of this thesis seems to clearly fit
the third Allisonian Model - Bureaucratic Politics.
"Rational 11 analyses dene by both sides in the AV-83 contro-
versy determined sets of costs, probabilities of success,
and values of alternatives completely in opposition to each
other. The way those analyses actually figured into the fi-
nal action was such that the hierarchial bureaucratic power
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on each side did not have much effect. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense, from a position of great power in the
executive branch, made a decision that its analysis was
best. This in turn led to the decision to cancel the AV-8B
program. The Marines, from a position several rungs lower on
the bureaucratic power ladder, showed that it was political
power that made the difference in the AV-8B decision. The
Marines took their analysis, along with their close air sup-
port expertise, their reputation, their V/STOL experience,
and their charisma (General Wilson was a recipient of the
Congr essional Medal of Honor and recieved a standing ovation
from the Congressmen and Senators each time he testified) to
Congress and successfully outplayed their DOD opposition in
the political game.
Which side was right? That guestion will not be answered
until the Marines take their Harriers to war. But, there may
be an indication of the Harrier's usefulness in the early
results of Britain's conflict with Argentina in the South
Atlantic. Because Britain has no large aircraft carriers,
the Harrier was the only fixed wing aircraft that could be
taken to the Falkland Islands on the two small aircraft car-
riers available. HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes each carried
twice the normal complement of Royal Navy Sea Harriers to
the Falklands, for a total of twenty Harriers [Ref. 90: p.
26]. The second task force sent by the British prior to
their invasion carried eighteen more Harriers. The second
group of Harriers was made up of model Gr.3*s, Royal Air
Force versions equivalent to the AV-8A. The British did not
have another aircraft carrier to send South, so the second
group of Harriers was transported on an 18,000 ton container
ship, the Atlantic Conveyor [Ref. 91: p. 27]. The concept
of operating Harriers from modified merchant ships, dis-
cussed in Chapter II, was studied by Colonel James W. Orr,
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DSMC [Ref. 16], and dramatically demonstrated by the
British. The use of that concept highlighted the importance
of the Harrier's flexibility. Once in the South Atlantic,
it was predicted by some that the Harriers would be outgun-
ned by the 230 plane force of Argentina's Air Force and
Navy. Among Argentina's planes were twenty-one Mirage Ill's
(a French supersonic fighter) , twenty-six Daggers (Israeli
modified Mirages), and eighty-two A-4 Skyhawks (the
McDonnell Douglas light attack plane) [Ref. 91: p. 28].
According to the British Defense Ministry, as of the first
week of June 1982, Harriers had been responsible for downing
at least twenty-five of the sixty-nine Argentine planes and
helicopters destroyed. While the British downed sixty-nine
planes, they lost only six Harriers, and none of those were
shot down by enemy planes. The advantage the Harrier has
over the Mirages and A-4's is its superior manueverability.
The British pilots are taking full advantage of the VIFFing
technique (Vectoring In Forward Flight) developed by U.S.
Marine pilots. VIFFing allows the British pilots to deceler-
ate so suddendly, that the enemy planes overshoot the
Harriers and then the quick acceleration of the Harrier,
with its high thrust-to-weight ratio, lets it become the
pursuer instead of the pursued. [Ref. 92: p. 16A and 93: p.
38]
The British accomplishments in the Falklands were in a
conflict that is on a smaller scale than is envisioned in
many of the scenarios found in Marine contingency plans. The
British were successful with older Harrier models that per-
form only half as well as the AV-8B. The Harrier has been
successful in the South Atlantic so far, and may prove that




CHRONOLOGY OF HARRIER DEV ELOPMENT
1958
Hawker Siddeley designs a V/STOL around the
Bristol BE5 vectored thrust engine
1959
BE5 engine funded by the MWDP (75*)
1960
P. 1127 prototype makes first tethered flight
P. 1127 prototype makes first free flight
1961
P. 1127 makes first full transition from a
hovering takeoff to straight and level flight
1965
Tripartite squadron formed around nine Kestrels
Hawker Siddeley gets a (Jevelopment contract for
the Harrier from the British Government
1966
First Harrier model is introduced
1967
First production Harrier completed
Royal Air Force orders 90 Harriers
1969
U.S. Marine Corps orders 12 Harriers (AV-8A's)
First RAF Harrier squadron is operational
1971
VMFA-513 recieves first 6 AV-8A*s and is redesignated
as VMA-513




McDonnell Douglas and Hawker Siddeley work on a
second generation Harrier, the AV-16A
Exercise VERSATILE WARRIOR validates Marine V/STOL
doctrine and concept
1973
Marine Corps submits SOR for an advanced V/STOL to
replace A-4 f s and AV-8A*s
Marine Corps makes final order for AV-8A*s for a
total of 110 (including 8 TAV-8A two-seat trainers)
1974
United Kingdom rejects cost-sharing plan for AV-16A
AV-16A plans are cancelled
1975
Marine Corps now has 4 AV-8A squadrons (one training)
McDonnell Douglas announces plans for its own AV-8B
1976
DSARC I approves AV-8 B plans, recommends prototypes
be developed by rebuilding two AV-8
A
1 s
OSD authorizes two YAV-8B's
1978
YAV-8B prototype testing begins
1981
MOO between U.S. and U.K. for joint production of
AV-8B's for the Marine Corps and the RAF by
McDonnell Douglas with British Aerospace and
Rolls Royce with Pratt 5 Whitney
First of four full-scale development AV-SB's begins
testing
1985?
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